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Introduction 
 
In November 1944 the Soviet government deported 94,955 Meskhetian Turks, Kurds and 
Khemshils to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizia. This group was the last of 11 major ethnic 
deportations completed between 1937-1944, starting with Koreans in the Soviet East, and 
continuing with Finns, Germans, Kalmyks, Karachays, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean 
Tatars, and Crimean Greeks. These groups were loaded onto trains and sent to Siberia, 
Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan,  Kirghizia,  Molotov,  and  Mari  ASSR‒with  populations  ranging  from  
approximately 750,00 Germans to approximately 15,000 Crimean Tatars. The deportations of the 
Koreans, Finns, and Germans were completed soon after the Soviet Union was invaded in 1941. 
These three diaspora communities were all from countries that were then considered Soviet 
enemies. They were not given the opportunity to fight for their home. It was an agreed upon fact 
within the government that these communities would act traitorously, and they were quickly 
rounded  up  and  deported.  The  other  seven  groups,  who  are  often  called  ‘the  punished  peoples’  
and who will be the focus of this paper, were deported later during the second wave, which 
began in late 1943.  
Away from their native land and stripped of the civil rights guaranteed by the Soviet 
constitution, the punished groups were moved into special settlements. In all cases the special 
settlements lacked sufficient housing, food, and supplies for the groups to survive. Since the 
majority of adult men from these seven groups were drafted into the Red Army, and were either, 
fighting, dead, or in a POW camp, over fifty percent of those deported in each ethnic group were 
children. To reach the special settlements entire populations were packed into freight trains with 
little food, water, or shelter from extreme elements. Great numbers of people, mostly children 
and elderly, died on the weeks long journeys to the new settlements. Those who did survive to 
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their destination watched as their relatives and neighbors died in mass during the first year. The 
mortality rate among the Crimean Tatars for the first year and a half of deportation was 17.7%, 
as starvation and disease forced them to bury thousands of their fellow tribesmen.1 
 The Soviet government maintained that these ethnic groups colluded with the Nazis 
during the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and therefore these groups were officially 
charged as traitors and were exiled as punishment. Accepting this explanation for the 
deportations  is  difficult.  Entire  ethnic  populations  were  deported,  under  the  charge  of  the  groups’  
collective guilt. The idea of mass punishment for the crimes of individuals is irrational. In 
addition, many other Soviet ethnic groups, including Russians and Georgians, were also invaded 
by the Germans in the early 1940s. Yet while these other groups too lived under Nazi 
occupation, they were not punished with deportation. In 1956, Party Secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev himself declared to the 20th Party Congress that the actions of individuals within an 
ethnic  group  were  not  the  determinant  of  their  republic’s  punishment.  He  stated  that: 
“The  Ukrainians  avoided  meeting  the  fate  [of  the  Kalmyks,  Karachays,  Chechens,  
Ingush, Balkars] only because there were too many of them and there was no place to 
deport them. Otherwise [Stalin] would have deported them too. (laughter and animation 
in the hall”2 
 
Lavrenti Beria and the NKVD carried out the deportation, but Khrushchev was an active member 
of the Politburo as of 1934 and would certainly have known about and been involved in 
conversations about the deportations. 
If the official explanation for the deportation of the ethnic minorities is questionable, then 
how does one account for the actions of the Soviet government? Many scholars have attempted 
to answer this question. The party tried to keep secret their deportation of over a million people 
during this period by not announcing the action until years later. However, residents of the 
                                               
1 Nekrich, 112. 
2 Khrushchev, Secret Speech.  
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former national republics noticed the full trains leaving, and the residents of the Siberian and 
Central Asian republics noticed the slightly less full trains arriving. In this period observant 
citizens also noticed the removal of certain national republics from official maps and 
encyclopedias. These indications along with word of mouth accounts from those who 
encountered the deported peoples became the basis for investigations on why these ethnic groups 
were punished.  
Research into this subject can be broken into two groups. On one side is early scholarship 
from the mid-1960s, assembled without much official information. On the other side is post-
USSR work, aided by access to various party archives. I use both sources in my paper, but point 
out the difference to highlight the more creative way in which the early author had to think and 
work.  Otto  Pohl’s  book  is  full  of  helpful  and  specific  statistics  he  found  in  the  Soviet archives. 
His work clearly tracks the days and weeks during which the populations were deported, as well 
as the suspiciously exact numbers of those deported. However when Pohl explains the reasoning 
behind the population transfer, he offers no new theses. Pohl writes that the regime exiled these 
groups  “in  order  to  remove  rebellious  ethnicities  from  strategic  areas”  and  therefore  “pursued  
ethnic  cleansing  as  part  of  [an]  overall  security  policy”3 during the war. This explanation 
parallels  the  party’s official explanation, which cites fear of unreliable elements. Yet the Nazis 
had already retreated from Soviet territory at this point in the war and other neighboring 
republics were not deported. Conclusively Khrushchev states to the 20th Party Congress that 
“deportation  was  not  dictated  by  any  military  considerations.”4 
Robert Conquest focuses much of his research in Nation Killers on the historical 
relationship these ethnic groups had with the Russian Empire. He details how each area was 
                                               
3 Pohl, 137. 
4 Khrushchev, Secret Speech. 
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conquered and when they were integrated. This framing, which is used by other scholars as well, 
is problematic. Though Conquest writes that the deportations were not due to the actions of the 
victims, when he includes their past resistance to Russian imperialism he is implying equal 
agency. Lengthy attention to the situation, past or present, in these republics ignores the true 
actor during the deportations: the Soviet government. It is helpful to understand how the Ingush 
lived during the war, but not in relation to a thesis on why they were eventually deported. Many 
areas and ethnic groups resisted Russian conquest, yet only a few of those groups were deported 
by the Soviets. Resistance to Russian imperialism, and additionally resistance to the Bolshevik 
revolution in 1917 or to collectivization in 1929-30 is not a workable thesis for action against the 
North Caucasian groups. Russians, Tatars, Ukrainians, Karelians, Daghestanis, and many others 
all opposed the same incursion into their societies. Perhaps these incidents could be evidence for 
why some of these smaller groups were chosen to be deported. But the choice to deport belongs 
to  Joseph  Stalin’s  regime,  whose  circumstances  and  motivations  are  unexplored  in  many  of  these  
works. 
Others authors claim that as a Georgian/Ossetian, Stalin carried within him a hate for 
other transcaucasian nations. This is, of course, unprovable. Perhaps he did. Ossetia did gain land 
from the Ingush Republic, but Stalin could have rearranged republics without deporting the 
entire populations.  Putting  forth  a  thesis  reliant  on  Stalin’s  personal  feeling  towards  specific  
groups again focuses too much on the who, which groups were chosen to deport, instead of the 
why,  why  did  the  regime  want  to  deport.  No  matter  how  strong  Stalin’s  allegedly  private 
resentful feelings were towards Chechens or Crimean Tatars, the thought that his revenge would 
be taken in the middle of WWII is nonsensical.  
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Kolarz  and  others  put  forth  the  views  that  the  deportations  occurred  “for  the  purpose  of  
acquiring land for agricultural  production”5 or to create a workforce in the depopulated lands of 
Central Asia and Siberia. Again, the timing for such an endeavor seems strange. Moreover the 
actions of the Soviet government after the deportations do not reflect such intentions. In Crimea 
the hilly and carefully cultivated land, especially vineyards, suffered for generations after the 
Tatars and Greeks were expelled. The Soviet government, in fact, had difficulties repopulating 
Crimea. The arid steppe in Kalmykia supported little agricultural production before the 
deportations, and this was not improved after 1943. The conditions the deported groups 
encountered at the end of their journey also do not give the impression that the regime had made 
any plans for the new residents. Kalmyks were sent to the freezing tundra and Karachays were 
sent to a flat desert. Traditional production techniques could not be used. These groups were in 
the most insidious way: out of their element. In Kolyma, there was a large group of Chechens. 
Populations  sent  to  labor  camps  weren’t  part  of  a  workforce  intent  on  improving  Far  East  
infrastructure; they were literally constructing buildings for no one. 
Life in the Soviet Union was changing after the Great Terror in 1937. An erosion of 
traditional socialist ideology was occurring within the country. Focus shifted away from self-
abnegation and towards individual gratification, as centralized economic planning finally 
stabilized.  Stalin  writes  in  1939  that  “progress  in  industry  and  agriculture  could  not  but lead to 
new  rise  in  the  material  and  cultural  standards  of  the  people,”  indicating  that  life  for  ordinary  
Soviet  citizens  was  again  undergoing  a  great  shift.  In  Stalin’s  speeches  and  in  various  party  
controlled newspapers, radio broadcasts, and books, socialist rhetoric was vastly different than it 
was in the 1920s or even five years earlier.  
                                               
5 Kolarz, 36. 
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To fill the void of socialism, which was the ideological foundation of the entire 
government,  Stalin’s  regime  increasingly  focused  on  nationalism  and  statism.  To  create this new 
identity, there needed to be new terms to describe the relationship between the peoples of the 
Soviet  Union.  Instead  of  workers,  they  were  a  family  and  they  made  up  a  ‘Family  of  Nations.  
The  idea  of  a  ‘Family  of  Nations’  is  at  its  core  a  weak metaphor. Socialism had a huge number of 
theoretical writings and years of debate to solidify itself as an identity, but the metaphor of 
family did not come from that type of rigorous critic. It rests on undefinable and traditional 
platitudes about love and  friendship.  At  the  end  of  the  war,  Stalin’s  victory  speech  labels  the  
Russians  as  the  “senior  brother”  in  this  family.  This  makes  explicit  what  had  always  been  
implicit in the shakey family metaphor: that there was a hierarchy and the Russians were at the 
top.  
The increase in Russian nationalism, encouraged by the 1940s government but 
condemned by Lenin, did not completely fill the absence of socialist ideology. And the 
paradoxical  nature  of  the  party’s  message  about  nationalism  was  dangerous.  Since  the  Soviet  
Union was founded on ideas, as opposed to ethnic or religious distinctions, what held the Soviet 
Union together if not socialism? Not enough attention has been paid to the major changes of the 
pre-war period by the scholars of deportations. If there is no connection  between  these  groups’  
actions during the war, then we must look instead to Soviet society before and during the war for 
clues to why the government acted in such a way. Even before the war, when the Soviets faced 
the most serious threat to their existence,  the  Soviet  Union  was  in  the  midst  of  an  ‘identity  
crisis’.  This  essential  confusion  and  feeling  of  instability  about  what  constituted  the  country  led  
to fear of the unknown and the future. Fear leads people to a react, often violently, and the 
deportations are certainly a violent act. When the Soviet government deported these minority 
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ethnic groups, they were not reacting to the behaviors or histories of a small group of their 
citizens and then responding with a logical and legal counteraction, they were projecting their 
fear  onto  an  ‘other’.  The  deportations  were  not  born  from  the  government's  feelings  of  control  or  
victory. I argue that it is exactly this fundamental instability about the future of communism and 
the identity of the USSR that drove the Stalin regime to deport entire populations of harmless 
and innocent ethnic groups in 1943 and 1944.  
In this paper I will begin by investigating the unsettled nature of the Soviet government's 
policy towards ethnic groups and nationalism from the very  onset  of  the  state’s  formation.  In  the  
confusion of where the government stood, I will also show the contrasting ways in which 
national policy was applied in the 1920s and 1930s due to the lack of a clear message from the 
central committee. After analyzing actual implementation of national policy pre-WWII, I will 
move towards tracking the changes in the Soviet message on nationalism in the late 1930s and 
during  WWII  in  the  early  1940s.  By  showing  the  Stalin  regime’s  conflicting  messages,  I  posit  
that this created confusion about the of nature Soviet identity and Soviet future. I will describe 
specifically how and to whom these deportations were carried out. In conjunction with the onset 
of war with Germany, I seek to show that the deportations in 1943 and 1944 were not a result of 
what these groups did or did not do during WWII or earlier, but were instead the culmination of 
a larger narrative about the uncertain place of national identity within the Soviet State. I hope by 
analyzing the interaction between the Soviet government and the national question through the 
years I can add an alternative thesis to the current scholarship as to why the Soviet government 
violently stole over a million people from their homelands in the middle of WWII. 
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Chapter 1: The Compromise Between Doctrine and Reality 
 
 Soviet national policy, much like Soviet economic and political policy, began to take 
shape before the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia. While in exile, Vladimir Lenin and many 
other  early,  or  ‘old,’  Bolsheviks  debated  and  crafted  their  positions  on  many  issues.  The  
Bolsheviks based these positions on Marxism but they also, especially Lenin, outlined new 
theoretical approaches and moved to their own innovative conceptions of a socialist ideology. 
Like the other issues, or questions, the Bolshevik response to the national question was guided 
by  Lenin’s  strong  opinions  and  then  honed  through  debate within the party and with other social 
democrats. Yet, the consideration given to the national question was not thorough enough to 
confront the reality of national dissatisfaction after the October Revolution. The Bolsheviks were 
shocked at how strident national resistance was to their regime, and this ignorance of the 
periphery could explain why their nationalities policy was so underdeveloped before the 
Revolution. The conditions in 1917 may have been right for a revolution in Russia, but were the 
Bolsheviks ready to lead it? 
 This chapter will discuss the origins of the nationalities policy from Karl Marx to Lenin, 
and how the Bolsheviks tried to hold together the territory of the former Russian Empire. The 
deeply conflicted opinions about what Bolshevik national policy should be, eventually came up 
against  real  world  rebellions  in  1917.  Using  Marx’s  theoretical  legacy,  the  Bolsheviks  tried  to  
craft a nationalities position ad hoc. While Lenin and Stalin used Marxism to justify the eventual 
incorporation  of  national  territories,  the  fact  remains  that  the  Bolsheviks  had  created  their  ‘war  
national  policy’  out  of  necessity.   
This ad hoc policy became law in 1924 when the constitution codified the messy truce 
the Bolsheviks and national opposition groups. Tenuous policy in place and territory secured, the 
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Bolsheviks  again  met  an  impasse:  the  countries  wouldn’t  separate,  but  how  were  they  to  be  
governed? 
According  to  Richard  Pipes,  “Marx  and  Engels  left  their  followers  little  guidance  in  the  
matters of nationality  and  nationalism.”1 This theoretical gap and the explosion of nationalism in 
early 20th century Europe created circumstances that were not envisioned by Marx. Marx and 
Engels theorized mostly about economic and political issues that were relevant to Europe, 
especially a Western Europe that was relatively nationally homogeneous. The national question 
was therefore not pressing. Though Marx and Engels did not seriously engage the national 
question, they did understand that nationalism was a force in Europe that competed with 
Marxism. They viewed nationalism not as an actual impediment, but as a possible distraction 
from socialism. In their view, the proletarian future was inevitable. Nationalism would swiftly 
crumble under the extreme stress of growing class divisions. 
From  Marx  and  Engels’  ambivalence  comes  Rosa  Luxemburg.  Placing  herself  as  an  
orthodox Marxist on the national question, Luxemburg developed her thesis while living in 
Poland from 1900 to 1910. She concluded that Poland should not be independent, as it was 
currently too closely tied with the Russian Empire economically. Mid-19th century Polish 
nationalism, which Marx himself approved of, would have been acceptable to Luxembourg, as it 
would have occurred under different economic circumstances than those in early 20th century 
Poland.  In  socialist  circles  and  writing  of  this  period,  “Luxemburgism”  became  shorthand  for  
“uncompromising  hostility  towards  all  national  movements  in  general.”2 
Luxemburgism was not particularly helpful to the larger group of post-Marxian socialists. 
Marxism had moved east and entered into more diverse and therefore nationally complex states 
                                               
1 Pipes, 21 
2 Pipes, 23. 
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such as the Russian, Austrian, and Ottoman Empires. In these areas nationality issues had to be 
addressed proactively, not ignored in favor of rigid Marxist doctrine. For these groups to bow to 
their  “inescapable  destinies...was  impractical  as  well  as  politically  inexpedient.”3 In addition, 
Marx and Engels' assumptions were failing: nationalism was not fading away in time as they had 
predicted. Instead, most prominently in the cases of the Austrian Socialists and the Bund, 
national agendas merged with socialist movements. 
In Austria the national problem had to be faced head on. The Habsburg Empire 
incorporated marginalized Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Italians, Slovaks, Croats, Romanians and 
other nationals, who demanded recognition. In 1899, the Austrian communists tried to find a 
common ground between territorial political-cultural autonomy and extraterritorial political-
cultural autonomy. The former envisioned an Austria-Hungary divided into national provinces 
and the latter viewed Austria-Hungary as a federation of nation-states. The conference failed to 
formulate a concrete position. 
In the next few years Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, both Austrian socialist theoreticians, 
progressed  both  ideas  on  territorial  autonomy.  They  wanted  the  nation  “to  be  recognized  as  a  
valuable  and  enduring  form  of  social  organization.”4 The nation was an organizational form that 
was rising in the lower classes. The European upper classes were internationalists, and had been 
for a long time. In contrast, the lower class minority groups had little contact with strangers 
outside their regions and therefore placed a greater value on their national identity. 
Renner  and  Bauer’s  work  became  the  ‘Austrian  project’,  which  sought  to  recognize  the  
cultural and linguistic rights of a nation, while neutralizing the need for political nationalism. In 
1907  Bauer  posited  that,  “The  advance  of  the  classes  shall  no  longer  be hampered by national 
                                               
3 Ibid. 
4 Pipes, 25. 
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struggles...the  field  shall  be  free  for  the  class  struggle.”5 With complete cultural-linguistic 
autonomy and equality there would be no reason to seek independent statehood. This theory was 
a significant advance in traditional social democratic nationalities policy. It was also a different 
way  of  approaching  the  solution  to  the  problem,  because  it  was  “a  compromise  between  theories  
of  socialism  and  the  realities  of  nationalism.”6 
The  Bund  took  quickly  to  the  “Austrian  project’.  Formed in 1897 in the pale residence, 
the Bund was a Jewish socialist party created out of various Jewish workers organizations. 
Originally  allied  with  Russian  workers’  groups  and  directed  towards  international  class  interests,  
the Bund recognized the parallels between the Jewish diaspora in Russia and that of the South 
Slavs in the Balkans examined by the Austrians. The Bund demanded to be recognized as the 
representative of the Jewish worker in Russia, but the request was denied at the Second Congress 
of Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1903.7 Bundists theoreticians continued to translate 
Austrian socialist pamphlets into Russian. Through this project, the Austrian idea of 
extraterritorial autonomy was able to spread to Armenian, Belarusian, and Georgian socialists 
and beyond. 
Lenin’s  own  thinking  on  the  national  question  evolved  over  time.  Pipes  separates  Lenin’s  
opinions into three periods: 1897-1913, 1913-1917, and 1917-1923;;  “In  the  first,  he  formulates  
his basic views; in the second, he develops a plan for the utilization of national minority 
movements in Russia and abroad; and in the third... abandon[ing] this plan, he adopts a new 
scheme  derived  from  his  practical  experience  as  ruler  of  Russia.”8 Of course the change was 
more nuanced than that neat description, but schematically Pipes is correct. 
                                               
5 Pipes, 27. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Pipes, 28. 
8 Pipes, 35. 
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Lenin believed in conditional self-determination, which was not necessarily in opposition 
to Marxist principles. He too, like most social democrats, loathed federalism and the idea of 
cultural autonomy. These  claims  would  lead  to  demands  for  “an  autonomous  class  state”9 he 
wrote, which was, in his opinion, completely anti-Marxist. 
The Bolsheviks had no statement of their own on the national question until 1913, when 
Lenin asked Stalin to write an article that would contradict the increasingly popular Austrian 
project. When Lenin was in Krakow, he observed the influence of nationalism on socialist 
progress  and  concluded  the  Bolsheviks  needed  to  make  a  statement.  Stalin’s  article  Marxism and 
the National Question was the first formulation of a Bolshevik position on nationalities. Scholars 
found the article to be full of logical fallacies and factual errors. Based on content, Pipes argues 
that  the  work  “would  long  ago  been  relegated  to  total  oblivion,  were  it  not  for  its  author’s  
subsequent  career.”10 This assessment highlights a very important fact: content aside, this 
pamphlet gave Stalin a theoretical niche within the Bolshevik party, which leads to many future 
projects dealing with national policy. Stalin himself writes in the preface to the 1920 edition of 
Marxism and the National Question that  “subsequent  events,  particularly  in  imperialist  war  and  
the disintegration of the Austria-Hungary into several national states, clearly demonstrated which 
side was right. Now when [Rudolph] Springer11 and Bauer are standing over the spilt milk pail of 
their  national  program,  there  can  hardly  be  doubt  that  history  condemned  the  ‘Austrian  
school.’”12 This statement exemplifies the Bolshevik theoretical perspective prior to the Civil 
War.  Yet,  due  to  practical  considerations,  they  adopted  many  of  the  ‘Austrian  school’s’  policies  
in the years to come.  
                                               
9 Pipes, 37. 
10 Pipes, 41. 
11 pseudonym of Karl Renner 
12 Stalin, 289. 
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Before  the  Revolution,  Lenin’s  personal  views  attempted  to  find  middle  ground  between  
the rightist Austrian school and leftist Luxemburgism.  This  attempt  “created  a  program,  which  as  
a  solution  of  the  national  problem  was  neither  consistent  nor  practical.”13 In 1913 Lenin attaches 
himself to the idea of national self-determination, a phrase open to conflicting interpretations. 
Lenin took it to mean that each nation possessed the right to separate and create an independent 
state. Aside from Poland and Finland, few nations wanted political independence at that time. 
Thus, Lenin saw self-determination as a gesture of goodwill toward national groups. He neither 
condoned nor believed that nations would actually separate, but he did believe that giving them 
the nominal right to self-determination  eased  their  ‘skittish  oppressed’  psyches. 
In contrast, not all fellow Bolsheviks agreed with how Lenin planned to address the 
national  question.  In  1915  the  opposition  to  Lenin’s  national  solution  was  led by Georgy 
Piatakov, Nikolai Bukharin, and Karl Radek. They were strongly influenced by Luxemburg, and 
Bukharin specifically saw self-determination as  “harmfully  utopian.”14 In 1916 Bukharin and 
Piatakov demanded the removal of Article 9 of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party 
Platform  of  1903,  which  stated  “The  right  of  all  nations  in  the  state  to  self  determinate.”15 Lenin 
personally advocated for this article in 1903. The request was not granted, but the idea did gain 
widespread support among high level and rank and file Bolsheviks. While this position was 
reached theoretically by Bukharin and others, it also gained adherents who had the prejudices of 
Great  Russian  Chauvinists.  Jeremy  Smith  summarizes  that  “the  emergence  of  a  contemptuous  
attitude to minority nationalities by many officials of the post 1917 Soviet State had many 
causes,  among  which  serious  theoretical  beliefs  cannot  be  dismissed.”16 
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Along with Bukharin and Piatakov, many other Bolsheviks simply could not understand 
Lenin’s  position.  The  Bolshevik  newspaper  Kommunist was suspended for attacking self-
determination in 1915. Mikhail Pokrovsky, Anatoly Lunacharsky, Felix Dzerzhinsky, and 
Alexandra Kollontai all argued with Lenin about the national position of the party. In fact, after 
the  Revolution,  Piatakov  blamed  Lenin’s  slogan  of  self-determination for the breakup of the 
Russian Empire.17 Of course, Lenin did not yield and instead became more vocal about his 
support for self-determination. Lenin likened national oppression to imperialism. The Marxian 
struggle of backwards nations would first take national form, he explained. Imperialism is not 
only economic oppression but also ethnic oppression, the latter of which, Lenin believed, was 
more easily understood by colonized peoples. Self-determination was therefore a slogan that 
could  be  used  as  a  “weapon  of  socialist  agitation.”18 Yet  Pipes  sees  Lenin’s  claim  that  self-
determination  was  the  solution  to  the  national  problem  as  “...entirely  inadequate.  By  offering  the  
minorities virtually no choice between assimilation and complete independence, it ignored the 
fact that they desired neither.”19 Lenin and the Bolshevik party as a whole misunderstood the 
desires of national minorities. Minority groups wanted equal rights. By ignoring national identity 
altogether, the left-wing Bolsheviks were denying that ethnic hierarchies had long been imposed 
upon  these  people.  The  minority  groups’  fear  that  such  a  system  could  continue  was  viable.   
Although the first priority for the Bolsheviks in October 1917 was the redistribution of 
land  in  the  countryside,  they  did  make  a  statement  on  the  “free  people  of  Russia”  and  their  right  
to self-determination a few weeks later.20 Lenin’s  ideological  stance  on  self-determination met 
with  the  people  of  the  former  Russian  Empire’s  actual  desire  to  separate.  The  reality  of  the  
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collapsing Russian Empire shocked the Bolsheviks. Besides White and Green Russians who 
fought against the Bolsheviks, Basmachi in Central Asia, Tatars in Samara, and Chechens in the 
Caucasus rebelled. The Bolsheviks found the rebellion by Ukrainians most confounding, as they 
saw no important difference  between  Ukrainians  and  Russians.  The  Bolsheviks’  focus  on  class  
imbalance blinded them to the inequality faced specifically by minorities in the Russian Empire, 
and the solidarity these groups felt. Despite their eventual victory, the Bolsheviks had remained, 
“largely...out  of  touch  with  the  broad  masses  of  the  population,  inexperienced  in  the  affairs  of  the  
state, and unaffected by the practical business of politics, such had forced Austrians to  modify,”  
their position on the national question.21 This ignorance allowed for minority resentment to grow 
after October 1917. The party used short sighted methods after the Revolution to spread 
Bolshevism and Pipes judges that: 
[The Soviet government] was inclined to utilize social forces hostile to 
minority interests. In the Ukraine, it favored that part of the industrial proletariat 
which was by ethnic origin and sympathy, oriented towards Russia and inimical to the 
striving local peasantry; in the Muslim areas, the colonizing elements and the urban 
population composed largely of Russian newcomers; in Transcaucasia and Belorussia, 
the deserting Russian troops. The Triumph of Bolshevism was interpreted in many 
borderland areas as the victory of the city over the village, the worker over the 
peasant, the Russian colonist over the native.22 
 
Though  to  qualify  Pipes’  statement,  the  Bolshevik  party  was  72%  Russian  in  1922  and  therefore  
the people that instigated in the borderlands were usually Russian.23 This fact does not however 
explain away the discriminatory policies in the Russian Empire that allowed Russians to engage 
in industrial urban work more easily than other groups. 
Once the Civil War did break out, the Bolsheviks began to truly interact with the national 
question as it became the national problem. Directly  after  the  October  Revolution,  “discussion  on  
the national question was focused on Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Finland, and to a 
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lesser extent Transcaucasia. Once in power however the Bolsheviks were confronted with the 
reality not only of the major non-Russian areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus but also with 
the  smaller  national  groups  of  the  Volga  region,  Siberia,  and  elsewhere.”24 The situation in 
Ukraine may be the most well-known case of national resistance to Bolshevik authority, but 
many other areas fought long and fierce campaigns against the Red Army. In Central Asia, the 
Bolsheviks did not fully gain control until the 1930s. The Basmachi revolt in Bukhara inspired a 
resistance movement that sustained itself for a decade. Neither military suppression nor political 
concession accomplished anything for the Bolsheviks from 1917 to 1921.25 By 1921 most of the 
other combatants had been subdued, but the Basmachi movement continued to successfully 
organize and operate.  
The Red Army did not put down the other rebellions easily.  Stalin writes that without the 
eventual support of national groups, the Red Army would not have defeated the Whites. “It  
scarcely  needs  proof,”  Stalin  asserts,  “that  had  [we]  not  won  this  confidence,  the  Russian  
proletariat  could  not  have  defeated  Kolchak  and  Denikin,  Yudenich  and  Wrangel.”26 Finland, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland however were lost and became sovereign states. The 
reassessment of national policy and new decisions on territorial administration were not made 
because minority groups simply declared independence. Fully realized battles were fought for 
almost five years in Western and Far Eastern Russia and the Caucasus, during which many 
citizens of the former Russian Empire perished. Organized rejection of Bolshevik authority, the 
horrors and difficulties of the Civil War, and the actions of Bolsheviks after the victories of the 
Red Army, compelled Lenin to change his views on nationalism. 
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Lenin’s  deconstruction  of  nationalism  became  very  important as the Civil War ended. 
Nationalism is split into two separate groups, Lenin explains. Local nationalism is formerly 
oppressed groups who needed to band together against a stronger and aggressive empire. 
According to him, Great Power Chauvinism, which is also sometimes referred to as Great 
Russian Chauvinism specifically, is the reverse and the more damaging nationalism. With this 
view, the oppressor people alienate minority groups and undermine progress. Local nationalism 
would fade Lenin argues, once equality is achieved. Then the proletarian and bourgeois elements 
of each national group will make themselves known, such as Lenin saw in Finland. Great Power 
Chauvinism is the enemy of the Soviet State, and Lenin worried that the chauvinism displayed 
by many of the Bolsheviks would undermine any credibility they had with the large amount of 
non-Russians. In 1897, a census taken by the Russian Empire showed that in its territory only 
44.3% of the population was ethnically Russian (though Pipes argues that the percentage was 
actually  lower  since  ‘Russian-ness’  was  determined  by  whether  or  not  the  person  spoke  Russian,  
which many non-Russians did).27 The Russians were still the largest national groups, but the 
territory  was  ‘majority  minority’  and  the  Bolsheviks risked the unity of the Soviet State if their 
chauvinistic  perception  wasn’t  changed.  Oddly,  Lenin  believed  that  the  greatest  Russian  
Chauvinists were not even Russian, but Russified Ossetians, Poles, and Georgians like Stalin, 
Dzerzhinsky, and Ordzhonikidze, whose violent treatment of peoples in the Caucasus during the 
Georgian Affair in 1923 set Lenin on notice. To combat discrimination in the Soviet State and 
reassure the minority groups, the Bolsheviks implemented a new strategy. 
Until 1922, Lenin and Stalin worked together to create the Soviet national policy. 
However, they differed when the time came to specify the national aspects of the constitution. In 
August 1922, Stalin suggested that the independent Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belorussia, 
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Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bukhara, Khiva, and the Far East should enter the Russian Union 
of Federated Socialist Republics (RSFSR) and become autonomous republics. Stalin's plan was 
accepted in September 1922.28 
Lenin  immediately  fought  against  Stalin’s  plan, which Lenin saw as undermining the 
status of the new republics. Lenin proposed the ‘Union of  Soviet  Republics  of  Europe  and  Asia’  
which  would  be  above  the  RSFSR  and  therefore  the  “RSFSR  and  the  independent  republics  
would  enter  as  equal  members.”29 Terry Martin argues that neither plan was more or less 
favorable to the independent nations, though Lenin framed his argument against Stalin as a battle 
against  Great  Russian  Chauvinism.  This  conflict  fostered  lasting  consequences.  Lenin’s  form  
denied Russians equal footing with the independent nations, as the Russian nation would share 
the  RSFSR  with  many  other  national  groups.  Stalin  believed  that  without  “recognizing  the  
Russians  as  the  USSR’s  state-bearing  nationality,”30 they would break off and split Moscow into 
the seat of power for both Russian and Soviet power. Later in 1925 Stalin returns to this thought 
when the possibility of an Ossetian ASSR appeared. He writes: 
“Now,  living  in  the  North  Caucasus  and  looking  closer  at  the  real  
conditions here, I see that this policy, if taken to extremes will unavoidably 
produce a number of serious minus, capable of worsening our political position in 
the Russian and non-Russian regions...the Cossacks already talk of autonomy and 
the creation of a Cossack Republic, declaring  that  they  “are  not  worse  than  
Ossetians  and  Dagestani”,  that  they  “also  have  their  own  interests,”  then  why  
insult the Russians, denying them what is given to the non-Russian.”  These  are  
sprouts of Russian nationalism, and that is the most dangerous form of 
nationalism...The collapse of the RSFSR--this is where we are going if we do not 
change  our  policy  now.”  31 
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Stalin’s  statement,  “Why  insult  the  Russians,  denying  them  what  is  given  to  non-
Russians”32 is  such  a  crucial  articulation  of  his  thoughts  even  in  1922.  In  Lenin’s  haste  to  satisfy  
the independent nations, an understandable action after the Civil War, he rushed past the 
sensitive feelings of Russians who may also have desired more formal recognition (regardless of 
the chauvinistic origins of that desire). Regardless, Stalin retreated from his stance in the summer 
of  1922  and  Lenin’s  proposal  was  accepted. 
By  late  1922,  Lenin  was  incapacitated  by  a  series  of  strokes.  He  wrote  his  “Testament”  in  
late December of 1922 and went on to write additional letters on the national question titled 
Question  of  Nationalities  or  “Automisation”  before the New Year. He withdrew from active 
politics in December 1922 after his right side became partly paralyzed; in March 1923 his career 
ended and Lenin was bedridden. The creation of the Soviet Constitution, led by Stalin, continued 
without him. Lenin was only lucid for the December 1922 Treaty of the Creation of the USSR. 
This treaty created the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR, from the RSFSR, 
Transcaucasian SFSR, Ukrainian SFSR, and Belorussian SFSR. This treaty became the bulk of 
the material of the 1924 Soviet constitution, which was approved in July 1923 and ratified in 
January 1924. This form solidified Stalin's desire for a centralized state above all else, but Martin 
finds  that  Stalin’s  implemented  proposal  was  “actually  more  in  keeping  with  the  ideology  of  the  
Affirmative Action Empire33.”34 The matching outcome of centralized power and the ability to 
control both Russian and local nationalism is amazing if intentioned and not coincidental. 
In June 1923, after the large Soviet nationalities were assured of their existence, the 
Soviets shifted focus towards small nationalities living within the RSFSR. Martin writes that, 
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“Soviet  policy  opposed  assimilation…  [and] extraterritorial national-cultural  autonomy,”35 so 
they created a policy radically different from their previous stance: korenizatsiia. Though Lenin 
pushed for linguistic autonomy even before the Revolution, in 1923 the Soviets introduced the 
idea of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs) and Autonomous Oblasts (AOs). These 
new territories would exist inside SSRs like the RSFSR. While all of the people inside the USSR 
were Soviet citizens, the language and culture of the titular nation of each territory was to be 
maximized. This was how the Soviets planned to successfully govern the people within the 
USSR. Though the Civil War was over and large independent nations had signed the 1922 
unification treaty, future conflicts were to be preemptively combated with korenizatsiia 
Korenizatsiia is a Bolshevik policy, which promoted national minority culture. In June 
1923, the public debate over national policy ended and the result was that the Soviet state would 
“maximally  support”  forms  of  national  life  that  did  not  interfere  with  central  state  authority.  
Therefore the Bolsheviks supported national territory, national culture, national language, and 
national  elites.  These  categories  mirror  Stalin’s  characteristics of a nation, outlined in Marxism 
and the National Question,  but  they  exclude  “community  of  autonomous  economic  life”,  which  
Stalin originally included. Intentionally, the Bolsheviks excluded political independence and 
economic  ‘maximization’,  as those aspects were crucial to their monopoly on power and 
therefore would be controlled by the center in Moscow. 
Ronald Grigor  Suny  translates  korenizatsiia  as  “indigenization”  coming  from  the  Russian  
phrase  ‘korennyi  narod’  or  indigenous  people.36 This policy allowed for an explosion in the 
creation of national schools, songs, theatres and literature, which was formerly impossible under 
the Tsarist government. Suny too posits that exponential freedom of national culture simply 
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couched  the  Bolshevik’s  desire to seem less Russian. While this is certainly true, as Lenin did 
not  want  to  be  seen  as  the  “heirs  to  Tsardom”  (an  attitude  which  he  accused  other  Bolsheviks  of  
harboring), the need to appease the national groups could be ignored. Whether nationalism was a 
natural  phase  of  Marxist  evolution  or  not,  the  idea  that  Soviet  power  was  a  “Russian  imposition”  
was not a hypothetical feeling for minority groups but an active and violent belief. Therefore 
after June 1923, the Bolsheviks aggressively pushed the policy of korenizatsiia throughout their 
controlled territory. They continued to strongly support the korenizatsiia policy throughout the 
1920s even in the face of post-Civil War national disputes.  
However support for korenizatsiia did not last. In the provinces korenizatsiia was always 
implemented sporadically, based on the preferences of the local party elites, who often did not 
agree with the program. In the mid-1930s, the central Soviet government began to selectively 
disassemble the program. The main target under the greater umbrella of korenizatsiia was 
linguistic autonomy. Though Lenin advocated for the freedom to use minority languages before 
the Revolution, by 1935 the Stalin regime had almost completely reversed its support. In 1933 
the decade long process of creating alphabets for small ethnic groups was turned upside-down. 
Formerly, new alphabets were freely permitted to use Latin or Cyrillic letters, depending on the 
linguist and the nuances of the spoken language. Yet, in 1933 this freedom was revoked, and all 
future efforts would have to use only the Cyrillic alphabet.  
One of the most frequently used arguments for increased Cyrillic alphabets and expanded 
Russian language in schools revolves around Marxist-Leninist theoretical works. Though Marx 
of course wrote in German, Party members argued that Lenin and Stalin wrote all of the core 
documents of the Revolution in Russian, and translating them diluted the accuracy and purity of 
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these  new  ‘classics’.37  In 1937 the Politburo issued a decree abolishing 4,598 national minority 
schools within the RSFSR. Within a year all non-Russian schools in Russian regions of the 
RSFSR were abolished.38 Linguistic freedoms were driven out of non-ASSRs and non-AOs, but 
territorial autonomy was not secure. The Soviet government reduced and consolidated many 
AOs before the 1936 constitution and completely eradicated national districts, national village 
soviets, and national kolkhozes.39 The end of korenizatsiia is a part of the process of Russian 
rehabilitation that Nicholas  Timasheff  named  “the  Great  Retreat.”  The  concept  is  defined  as  “the  
gradual abandoning of revolutionary and utopian social and cultural practices in favor of 
traditional, often prerevolutionary,  values.”40 Martin  calls  it  ‘unfortunate  term’  but  it  does  
accurately point out that a large shift away from the current path occurred.  
To  be  clear  about  the  level  of  Stalin’s  active  participation  with  this  specific  issue,  as  
Stalin’s  name  or  regime  is  very  often  referenced:  Stalin’s  personal  involvement  with  all aspects 
of national policy was strong. In this paper references to Stalin do not simply indicate the 
Stalinist period or submit to the assumption that Stalin personally controlled everything. Top 
down  or  bottom  up,  Stalin’s  role  in  creating  national  policy  is  clear.  Stalin  was  the  Bolshevik’s  
acknowledged  “master  of  the  nationalities  question,”41 Martin plainly states. Stalin wrote 
Marxism and the Nationalities Question, which is the first text on this subject by the Bolsheviks, 
in 1913. He was Commissar of Nationalities from 1917 to 1924 and was the official 
spokesperson at the Party Congress on the national question. It was in this early period that 
Stalin worked closely with Lenin to articulate what would become the codified national policy in 
the Soviet constitution. After leaving his post as Commissar of Nationalities, Stalin continued to 
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be deeply involved with national policy until his death. Later actions by the government in the 
Stalin era involving national problems would certainly have been handled directly by him. 
Therefore, with this knowledge of his pre and post Revolution work as well as later comments on 
the  subject,  Stalin’s  personal  involvement  and  orchestration  of  the  deportations  of  nationalities  
from 1937 to 1944 is highly likely. 
Once in power the Soviets struggled to create the state they envisioned. For many years 
prior to the Bolshevik take over and the formation of the Soviet Union, the importance of 
national self-identity proved difficult for many Bolsheviks to understand and therefore integrate 
into their program. The party moved from non-acceptance of nationalities to self-determination 
to  korenizatsiia  and  then  conflict  between  Lenin  and  Stalin’s  conceptions  of  these  ideas.  The  
Bolshevik’s  stance  on  national  policy  is  difficult  to  track. The path desired by Lenin was 
contentious within the party, and then any compromise reached was uprooted by the Civil War 
and the violent response to the Bolsheviks government from many future SSRs.  
As the Soviets gained military control over the area they believed to be their patrimony, 
new problems arose. Centrally governing this vast territory was something the Tsarist regime had 
never accomplished, despite trying both aggressive Russification and autonomous government. 
Driven by the core desire to centralize the important aspects of a state, politics and economics, 
korenizatsiia is developed. The cultural explosion allowed by korenizatsiia is crucial in the 
history of many national minorities and cannot be discounted. Yet, its successes are not as 
important as the brevity of the program. Depending on the area, korenizatsiia lasted only 
between 10 and 15 years before the Soviet government began to retake cultural-linguistic 
autonomy. This program was the base of minority relations and a supposed building block for the 
future of national cultural expansion. Instead, less than a generation later, a top-down and 
25 
 
 
 
therefore Russian cultural mandate was instated. From 1917 to the 1930s nothing about national 
policy was decided. There were no five year plans or goals about how many native language 
schools or newspapers should be established. At the end of korenizatsiia, after the Great Terror 
had the population of every nationality living in traumatized alertness, a new stage of national 
relations was created by the Soviet government. 
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Chapter  2:  Let’s  Open  the  Floodgates 
 
It is impossible to posit how Russian nationalism would have developed in the Soviet 
Union without the catalyst of WWII. The early progress of Russian nationalism at the very end 
of the 1930s was not wide in scope or rapid in implementation; it was pointed and the privileges 
it gave were difficult to discern without the information we have now. National policy changes 
were traditionally slow to work. With the continued and vocal support of the government, 
korenizatsiia slowly built upon itself each year for a decade. Yet, WWII did occur and with it 
came a sharp increase of aggressive Russian nationalism, completely unseen before in the Soviet 
Union. Each reference to Russian past as common past or Slav nationalism as Soviet patriotism 
reveals the hierarchy of nations that defined the Soviet Union and its policies from this period 
onwards.  
Some  scholars  posit  that  Stalin's  regime  didn’t  believe  that  socialism  could  fully  inspire  
the people of the Soviet Union to fight the Nazis. Other question whether or not the regime took 
cues from German rhetoric, which focused on the Russian ethnic character of the Soviet Union in 
their propaganda. Regardless of these ideas, Russian nationalism grew and displaced Soviet 
communism in official rhetoric. The Family of Nations and Friendship of the Peoples were 
introduced as new conceptions of how people should relate to each other, aside from their 
common identity of comrades and members of the proletariat. Unlike the program of 
korenizatsiia before it, the policy of Family of Nations created destructive situations for other 
groups. The Russians, whose developed culture was not in doubt, did not suffer during 
korenizatsiia;;  while  the  ‘minor  brothers’  on  the  family  tree  lost  freedoms  under  the  unstable  
doctrine of Friendship of the Peoples. Russian nationalistic rhetoric and existential and 
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ideological threats from the Nazis fostered a violent escalation in minority-majority and center-
periphery relations. 
Terry  Martin  describes  korenizatsiia  as  “a  highly  indirect  strategy  for  achieving Soviet 
unity.”1 Though his book An Affirmative Action Empire is a thorough study of the rise and fall of 
korenizatsiia, Martin understands that the Soviets did intend for an eventual cultural unity. The 
Soviet Union wanted to be viewed as a multiethnic state, not just a state made up of multiple 
ethnic territories. Before, national expression was limited to within separate autonomous 
territories, large and small. The unity was not yet achieved in the 1930s. Stalin explains in 1929 
that to achieve this  unity,  “we  want  to  prepare  the  elements  of  an  international  socialist  culture  
by means of maximum development of national culture,...we want to unify the nations of various 
countries  by  dividing  them,...Whoever  doesn’t  understand  this  vital  formulation  of the question 
doesn’t  understand  that  we  are  conducting  a  policy  of  maximum  development  of  national  culture  
so that it can exhaust itself completely and then a base can be created for organizing an 
international  socialist  culture.”2 This successor culture Stalin references would be the elusive 
Soviet culture, which was inherently multiethnic.  
In  Martin’s  study  of  korenizatsiia,  he  notes  that  Russian  culture  was  considered  so  
damaging in the 1920s by Party leadership that it took a decree from the Politburo in 1932 to 
even legally rehabilitate Russian national identity in the public sphere. Again the reason why 
these checks on Russian nationalism were instituted in the 1920s involved the contrast made 
between the concepts of local nationalism and Great Power Chauvinism (which was frequently 
changed to Great Russian Chauvinism. Lenin usually used the more abstract version of the term, 
even when discussing it in a specific Russian context. He very rarely used the word Russian or 
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Russia in his work towards the end of his life). Local nationalism should be expected, while 
Great Power Chauvinism should be prevented. 
The end of korenizatsiia and the changes made about the legality of Russian nationalism, 
Russian self-expression, and Russian status in the RSFSR built a framework for the explosion of 
Russian nationalism from about 1938 through WWII. The signals sent by the Soviet government 
when overturned korenizatsiia were not only received by the confused Soviet minorities but also 
by Russians all over the Soviet Union. The reversal came about not to find a voice for Russians 
because they were marginalized or because Russians mounted an armed rebellion a la some 
minorities during the Civil War. The extent to which Russian culture was promoted as the main 
Soviet nationality before the war shows an intentional policy shift from above, unconnected to 
any major pro-Russian  movement.  Though  the  war  gave  a  platform  to  Stalin’s  overt  Russian  
nationalist rhetoric and symbols, the idea that he only employed them to inspire the country 
holds little water. The Russians were the largest ethnic group in the Soviet population, and 
therefore they had the greatest number of soldiers in the Red Army and suffered the greatest 
number of casualties. To an outsider it makes little sense to  appeal  to  a  Soviet  citizen’s  ethnic  
background in 1941 because communist doctrine advocates class identity. Yet the Soviet 
government pushed an ethnic definition of self. 
As the Soviet government sanctioned greater Russian self-expression within the RSFSR, 
Stalin began to introduce new conceptions of the relationship between the various ethnic groups 
that made up the citizenry of the Soviet Union. In 1935 Stalin first used the metaphor Friendship 
of the Peoples. This metaphor enables Stalin to assert Russian linguistic and cultural dominance 
within the RSFSR and beyond, while not explicitly calling for Russification. By 1938 Friendship 
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of  the  Peoples,  as  well  as  Family  of  Nations,  “was  the  official  sanctioned  metaphor  of  an  imaged  
multinational community.”3 
The Great Retreat intersects with many important periods in Soviet history. In the late 
1930s Stalin gained complete political control due to the Great Terror. Under his leadership the 
Soviet Union reached stability in their planned economy, and culturally the peoples of the Soviet 
Union allegedly defeated Tsarist inequality under his watch. Stalin claims in a 1935 speech to a 
conference of the foremost collective farmers of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, that after 18 years 
of Soviet rule the Tsarist policy  of  trying  “to  make  one  people--the Russian people-- the ruling 
class and all other peoples--subordinated”  was  finished.  He  continued  to  say  that:   
“The former distrust between the peoples of the USSR has already come to an end. 
That distrust has been replaced with a complete mutual trust. The friendship between 
the people of the USSR is growing and strengthening. That, comrades, is the most 
precious  thing  that  the  Bolshevik  national  policy  has  given  us…  For  while  this  
friendship lives and blossom we are afraid of no one, either internal or external 
enemies.”4 
This is an important statement by Stalin because it almost closes the theoretical loop on 
the national question from the 1920s. Here Stalin claims that Great Russian Chauvinism is over; 
the people have reconciled under the Soviet system and overcome any past mistrust towards 
Russians (this mutual trust unfortunately does not spread to other nationalities with blackened 
reputations such as the Crimean Tatars or Chechens). With this speech Stalin is negating both 
conceptions of nationalism discussed in the previously chapter: Great Power Chauvinism and 
local  nationalism.  Therefore  whenever  there  is  an  ‘instance’  of  nationalism  it  will  be  
unwarranted  and  the  perception  will  be  negative  since  “mutual  trust has  been  victorious.”  Since  
Great  Power  Chauvinism  had  disappeared  according  to  Stalin,  any  ‘local  nationalism’  is  no  
longer a considered a natural opposition to imperialism, but a separate and traitorous deed. From 
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1935 forward Stalin only speaks on the existence of local nationalism and his critiques of general 
nationalism refer strictly to minority nationalism. 
Martin notes that as Russian nationalism grows, the definition of a nation changes in 
Stalin’s  writings  and  speeches.  Stalin’s  first  high  profile foray into minority policy was his 1913 
pamphlet, Marxism and the National Question. As stated earlier, the pamphlet was not a 
theoretical success and delivered few new ideas to greater socialist thought on the subject. As 
was typical of the period and early  Bolshevik  thinking,  Stalin  describes  a  nation  as  “not  racial  or  
tribal,  but  a  historically  constituted  community  of  people.”5 In the late 1930s, the Stalin regime 
put forth a new primordial conception of a nation, which was a shift away from the former 
modern construct. The primordial view asserted that ethnicity was natural and unchangeable. 
New emphasis was placed on folkloric elements of cultures in an attempt to stress the depth and 
historicity of national culture.6 The heighten promotion of national culture came at the expense 
of national language autonomy, which was the cornerstone of the privileges of korenizatsiia. As 
minority cultural autonomy expanded, Russian language instruction spread. In 1937 Russian 
language became a required subject in all non-Russian schools in the Soviet Union.7 
The mid-1930 period of cultural escalation, at what was clearly the end of the important 
linguistic aspects of korenizatsiia, coincides with ratification of the second Soviet constitution. 
The passage of the 1936 constitution created five new SSRs and five new ASSRs. This was 
propagated as another victory of the mutual trust between nationalities, that new territorial 
formations could be created for the good of the state without any misunderstandings or distrust. 
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Ethnicities were separated and catalogued into nation-territories or petty nation-states under a 
larger Russian authority.8 
At this time, Stalin abandons the greatest danger principle, when he proclaims the end of 
Great Russian Chauvinism--which was the great danger to peaceful minority integration into the 
Soviet  Union  in  early  1920s.  Only  to  quietly  shift  the  meaning  of  greatest  danger.  Stalin’s  regime  
does a great deal to seemingly pacify the Russian ethnic group in the late 1930s, though there is 
no evidence that is was politically necessary. Stalin himself wishes to change Soviet identity 
away from class distinction to an individual, be they Russian or a minority. Korenizatsiia was 
seen  as  necessary  to  create  a  proletariat  within  the  suppressed  and  ‘backwards’  nations,  but  since  
the Russian nation had already achieved class consciousness during the Revolution there is no 
theoretical explanation for a shift back to Russian ethnic identity. A return to Russian 
nationalism does not fit in the Soviet framework, as it contrasts class identity.9  
It is also around this period of increasing Russian nationalism and national primordialism 
that passport identification becomes rigid. In early 1932 when Soviet passports were introduced, 
one could choose the nationality given on a passport. In 1938 passport nationality was based on 
inherited ethnic background in an effort to catalogue diaspora communities, Germans, Poles, 
etc.,  who  were  Soviet  Citizens.  The  creation  of  a  historical  and  identified  ‘other’  again  moved  
away from the Soviet class ideology and towards ethnic distrust and hate. 
In the late 1930s the idea that Russians were the First among Equals was pushed by the 
Stalin regime. Accomplished Russian figures in music, art, literature, science, etc., were always 
recognized by the Soviet government, but from 1937 and beyond their Russianness and the 
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national character of their genius was emphasized.10 Privately Stalin had made statements about 
the greatness of the Russian worker and Russians as the revolutionary vanguard nation, but only 
in  this  period  was  this  idea  articulated  publicly  by  the  Stalin  regime.  Even  the  superlative  ‘great’  
is added to the Russian ethnic group, changing the negative phrase Great Russian Chauvinism to 
Great Russian People in a generation. 
Additionally, the Soviet government put out propaganda thanking the Great Russians for 
their  “brotherly  help”11 in gaining the trust of the minorities, and therefore facilitation the 
Friendship of the Peoples. Non-Russians were to be grateful to the Russians for their 
accomplishment of not acting in an imperialistic and chauvinistic manner. At the same time in 
Europe, anti-Russian fascist rhetoric was rising in German and Poland. While the Soviet Union 
then had the veneer of a multiethnic modern state, anti-Russian and anti-Slav sentiment from 
external enemies encouraged Russian national pride and public expression within the Soviet 
Union.12 
The best evidence of how Stalin wished to articulate the Soviet Union to its citizens 
during the WWII is found in his speeches. His personal vision for the Soviet Union could be seen 
in Pravda articles and speeches by other Politburo members, both of which would likely be 
approved by Stalin beforehand if possible. His own speeches carried much more influence and 
plainly articulated what Stalin was thinking, instead of grasping a hint of what he wanted to 
imply. The speeches made by Stalin were designed to project and insert into the minds of his 
audience a glimpse, though edited, of his own thinking on various issues.  
There are few documents from the war period that address internal social issues such as 
the deportations, aside from direct and brief orders to organize the said transfers. Therefore 
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Stalin’s  speeches  are  invaluable  to  understanding  the  atmosphere  in  which  the  deportations  were  
approved. The signs that Stalin puts in these speeches point to prominent and aggressive Russian 
and Slav nationalism, which grows from 1941 to 1945. Throughout the war Stalin gives troops 
and civilians Orders of the Day, but these are short messages filled usually with military jargon 
and  division  locations,  and  don’t  give  much  information  about  deeper  cultural issues. In addition 
to dozens of Orders of the Day messages, during the war Stalin provided a steady schedule of 
longer speeches. He spoke on the day Germany invaded the Soviet Union, June 22, 1941 and a 
week later on July 3, 1941 to announce the mobilization of the Soviet people and the Red Army. 
After that he made speeches every November 6 and 7 in honor of the October Revolution; every 
February 23rd in honor of the Founding of the Red Army; and every May 1st for May Day. This 
pattern continued uninterrupted until Victory Day in 1945. 
In  each  of  his  speeches,  Stalin  signs  off  with  a  few  lines  such  as  “long  live  the  Red  Army  
and  Navy”  or  “long  live  our  glorious  country.”13 These parting phrases change over time. At the 
beginning  of  the  war  he  praises  “the  country,”  “the  inviolable  friendship  of  the  people,”  
“glorious  Lenin”  etc.  Quickly  the  “great country”  became  the  “motherland”  and  “homeland.”  
This  in  itself  is  not  suspect  to  any  preference,  as  Stalin  sometimes  thanks  the  “Soviet  
motherland.”14 But the content of the speeches implies specifically that the motherland and 
homeland of Russians and Slavs is being defended. Modern German aggression is compared to 
the  Russian  Empire’s  victory  over  Napoleon  and  the  First  Patriotic  War  (though  patriotic  has  a  
different meaning in this period) and more explicitly as part of a centuries long conflict with anti-
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Slav Germans, who last attacked in 1914. Stalin claimed in 1941 that the enemy is out to 
“destroy  national  culture”15 and emphasizes the Russians as targets. 
When quoting  Hitler  in  his  speeches,  Stalin  focused  on  Hitler’s  anti-Slavic views before 
contrasting their communist-fascist  positions.  “We  must  exterminate  the  Slav  peoples,”  Hitler  is  
quoted  in  Stalin’s  speech.  Stalin  makes  Russians  the  vanguard  nation  of  the Slavs and then 
explains  the  fight;;  these  “people  with  morals  of  beasts,  have  the  audacity  to  call  for  the  
annihilation of the great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanov and Lenin, Belinsky and 
Chernyshevsky, Pushkin and Tolstoy, Glinka and Tchaikovsky, Gorky and Chekov, Sechenov 
and  Pavlov,  Repin  and  Surikov,  Suvorov  and  Kutuzov.”16 Stalin claims that the Germans want a 
war of annihilation against the peoples of the Soviet Union, but he almost always refers to Slavic 
peoples and only seems to care about Russians and their culture. When he mentions his desire to 
liberate  enslaved  peoples,  Stalin  always  specifies  Slavs  and  then  joins  all  the  rest  as  ‘and  others’. 
Stalin made further claims when speaking to a multicultural audience of Soviet citizens in 
1941. He refers to Alexander Nevsky, Dmitri Donskoi, Kuzma Minin, Dmitry Pozharsky, 
Alexander  Suvorov,  and  Mikhail  Kutuzov  as  “our  great  ancestors.”17 This statement is made a 
few lines above a reference to the motherland, which can only be understood as a connected 
narrative. 
In 1942 Stalin continues to emphasize national primordialism by beginning to use the 
phrase  “our  native  land,”18 a conception that has no bearing on members of the international 
quality of the proletariat or of communists. In the speeches Stalin only quotes Russian writers19 
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and Russian sayings20 and continually quotes Hitler and other Axis leaders who specifically want 
to  “destroy  Russia.”21 
These quotes and many like them culminate in a climax of praise for Russians that Stalin 
truly lets loose after the Nazi surrender. In the famous Victory Day speech broadcast on the 
radio, Stalin continues with references to the motherland while admitting that his high command 
is all Russian.22 He  frames  this  victory  as  a  “centuries  old  struggle  of  the  Slav peoples…  
[against]  German  invaders”23 and  mocks  Hitler’s  claims  that  German  “shall  destroy  Russia  so  
that  she  will  never  be  able  to  rise  again.”  If  one  focuses  on  Stalin’s  words,  this  is  not  a  “victory  
of  the  people”  as  he  mentions,  but  a  victory  of  the  Russians. This implication is made fact in 
Stalin’s  famous  Toast to the Russian People speech: 
Comrades, permit me to propose another toast, the last one.  
I would like to propose that we drink to the health of the Soviet people, 
and primarily of the Russian people. (Loud and prolonged applause and 
cheers.)  
I drink primarily to the health of the Russian people because it is the 
most outstanding of all the nations that constitute the Soviet Union.  
I drink to the health of the Russian people, because, during this war, 
it has earned universal recognition as the guiding force of the Soviet 
Union among all the peoples of our country.  
I drink to the health of the Russian people, not only because it is the 
leading people, but also because it is gifted with a clear mind, a staunch 
character and patience.  
Our government committed no few mistakes; at times our position 
was desperate, as in 1941-42, when our army was retreating...Another 
people might have said to the government: You have not come up to our 
expectations. Get out. We shall appoint another government, which will 
conclude peace with Germany and ensure tranquility for us. But the 
Russian people did not do that, for they were confident that the policy their 
government was pursuing was correct; and they made sacrifices in order to 
ensure the defeat of Germany. And this confidence which the Russian 
people displayed in the Soviet Government proved to be the decisive factor 
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which ensured our historic victory over the enemy of mankind, over 
fascism.  
I thank the Russian people for this confidence!  
To the health of the Russian people! (Loud and prolonged applause)24 
 
 The views of almost the only man that mattered in the Soviet Union could not be more 
explicit. Again in a position of power at the end of the war, Stalin chose to say these words, 
chose to inflame Russian nationalism. He seemed very comfortable expressing these sentiments.  
This solidifies the supposition that it was Stalin himself who encouraged Russian nationalism in 
the late 1930s. To qualify, this last speech was made in the Kremlin at a reception in honor of 
Red Army commanders and therefore was not as public as the radio speech he made on Victory 
Day. 
 In  addition  to  overt  Russian  nationalism  in  Stalin’s  speeches  there  is  great  evidence  of  
hypocrisy in reference to the deportations. Stalin criticized German racial theory in 1942 and 
seeks to separate the people from the actors or the government. The Red Army does not 
exterminate  “German  soldiers  just  because  they  are  German...because  it  hates  everything 
German...The Red Army is free of feelings of racial hatred... because it has been brought up in 
the  spirit  of  racial  equality  and  respect  for  the  rights  of  other  people.”25 Policies such as First 
Among Equals and the Great Retreat assure us that soldiers of the Red Army were not raised in 
racial equality. At this point the rights of Soviet Germans, Finns, and Koreans were not respected 
but violated and soon the punished people would be deported as well. Even though Stalin chides 
that  “one  should  not  forget that in our country any manifestation of racial hatred is punished by 
law,”26 there is no reassurance that those who are the law will not pervert it. One could not sue 
the Soviet government so there was no legal recourse to defend oneself against a predatory state. 
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 Later  in  Stalin’s  speeches  he  describes  the  Italo-German coalition as possessing 
characteristics  of  “race  hatred;;  domination  of  the  chosen  nation…;;  economic  enslavement  of  the  
subjugated  nations.”27 Yet in his own country, the government acts in those ways towards the 
soon  to  be  deported  populations  and  minorities  in  general.  Stalin’s  regime  does  not  practice  “the  
equality  of  nations  and  integrity  of  their  territory,”28 which he claims defines the program of the 
Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. In truth, Russian nationalism and ethnic hierarchies remain 
and autonomous oblasts and republics are destroyed and reconfigured at a whim. 
 Stalin  joyfully  claims  victory  when  the  German  army  is  expelled  from  “Chechen-Ingush, 
North Ossetian, Kabardino-Balkarian, and Kalmyk ASSR and Cherkess, Karachi, and Adygei 
[AOs]”29 but this is a tactical joy. The people of these places are already suspected and a few 
months away from violent removal, their liberation is not celebrated. In November 1944 after all 
the deportations have taken place, Stalin makes a speech in honor of the 27th Anniversary of the 
October  Revolution.  In  it  he  claims  that  “Soviet  patriotism  blends  harmoniously  with  the  national  
traditions of the peoples...Far from dividing them, Soviet patriotism held all nations and peoples 
of our country in a single fraternal family. This should be regarded as the foundation of the 
inviolable  and  ever  stronger  friendship  among  the  people  of  the  USSR.”30 There is no respect for 
national traditions such as language, only specific folkloric exoticism. Soviet patriotism, a 
jumble of Russian nationalism and Soviet statism, had been used to sanction violence by 
extralegally deporting ethnic minorities in secrecy, which most certainly violated the Friendship 
of the People. There is no such foundation in the Soviet Union based on friendship of family. It 
was weak even before the war when Russian nationalism illuminated the non-egalitarian 
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structure of the new hierarchies. The inviolable was violated as almost a million people were 
deported. The new conceptions of Soviet identity are obviously fraudulent. They cannot hold the 
people together any more than being part of the Russian Empire could in 1917. 
 Yet these metaphors were the foundation of the Soviet Union from around 1938, as 
Stalin’s  own  words  confirm.  As  proved  before,  it  was  Stalin’s  choice  to  rehabilitate  Russians  in  
the  Soviet  Union.  In  1938  he  had  already  “brought  about  a  full  guarantee”31 for himself. There is 
perhaps no  person  or  circumstance  that  can  compel  Stalin  to  act  in  a  way  which  he  doesn’t  want.  
So he rehabilitates the Russians. But this is not done out of any great love for Russian people. As 
with  many  of  Stalin’s  decisions,  this  was  done  in  service  of  greater centralization of power. 
Allowing  the  Russians  to  be  the  “state-bearing  people”32 tied the largest national population 
tightly  to  the  Soviet  state.  This  unification  would  give  Stalin’s  regime  greater  control  over  the  
peripheries,  where  many  Russian  ‘colonists’  lived,  and  the  western-center population, where the 
highest concentration of people lived. Purchasing the Russians loyalty with praise was blunder.  
 Stalin’s  plan  backfired  when  the  Nazis  invaded  the  Soviet  Union.  Before  this,  the  
weakness of the family metaphor was not rigorously tested. From 1935 to 1938 korenizatsiia was 
very slowly disassembled and most of people were focused on their personal safety during the 
Great Terror. As Stalin started to lean into Russian nationalism, much to the confusion of 
citizens who were used to claiming a proletarian class identity, Germany attacked. The Soviet 
Union faced its greatest threat in its history and its leader had just recently pulled out the 
foundation of the country. 
 What Stalin must not have fully understood, or believed, was how fundamental peaceful 
ethnic relations and fair national policy was to the existence of the Soviet Union. In the 1920s 
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Stalin himself spoke passionately about the  “inseparable connection [of] the national 
question...with the question  of  the  victory  of  the  Revolution.”33 The memories of the Civil War 
would  have  been  fresh  in  Stalin’s  mind  in  1925,  reminding  him  of  the  chaos  of  the  pre-
constitutional years. Therefore unless his early work was political pandering, Stalin no longer 
considered minority equality to be politically necessary in 1938.  
 Freed from national considerations in favor of the full support of Russians, Stalin dives 
into nationalism to hopefully power the Soviet Union through WWII. Despite building up its 
material capacity in 1930 and 1940, from 1941 to 1942 the Red Army lost often and on multiple 
fronts. The future of the Soviet Union was uncertain; their ability to defeat the Nazis was truly 
unknown. Fear grew in Soviet society and in the Kremlin as well. Though the deportations 
occurred in 1943, after the military position of the Red Army was not so dire, instability still 
controlled the country. The deported groups, or punished people, are easy targets. They are 
small, they have low levels of industry, and they are isolated by their landscape. Punishing them 
was easy. Engaging with the German army required complicated and intricate plans, with no 
guarantee of success. Acting against the minority groups in the Caucasus and the Black Sea 
region was secured victory in a whirlwind of chaos. Yes, this operation would also by default 
punish Nazi collaborators. But there must have been a more efficient way to do that. The 
deportations must have benefitted the Stalin regime in some way.  
Looking further than his notorious  paranoia  and  obsession  with  ‘the  fifth  column,’  the  
deportations were similar to earlier purges. While they must be carefully organized, purges are 
not difficult to carry out since each one often came as a surprise to the groups it targeted. The 
newly liberated  minorities’  shock  unquestionably  allowed  the  NKVD  and  other  security  forces  to  
frequently complete their operations ahead of schedule. With every successful deportation, 
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feelings of control and power must have flooded party leaders who sat impotently in Moscow. 
The Soviet government continued to execute major purges on minority groups up until the war 
was almost decided, and the status quo was on its way to being restored. 
The rise of Russian nationalism had a great effect on the all peoples of the Soviet Union. 
For policy makers and serious Bolsheviks, the growth of nationalism meant that other practices 
had to be pushed aside. Long term absolute power had blinded top party members as to why the 
Soviet Union was structured in such a way. Even when they knew that national culture had not 
yet  “exhausted  itself”  they  moved  to  dismember  the  truce  of  1925.  In  the  end  weak  metaphors  
could not sustain a wartime population, who craved consistency and strong foundations. And 
they  couldn’t  make  the  Stalin  regime feel invulnerable either. To feel powerful again, the Stalin 
regime threw itself onto insignificant and tiny minority groups and virtually destroyed them. 
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Chapter 3: "Stop Playing Internationalism"1 
 
In the midst of WWII the Stalin regime diverted a huge amount of human and material 
resources to deport almost a million Soviet citizens from their homelands thousands of miles 
away to Central Asia and Siberia. The Russian nationalism that rose during the war reached its 
zenith in these actions against groups that were exclusively small non-Christian ethnic 
minorities. The swift escalation in discrimination belies something in the character of the Soviet 
government of that time. The Stalin regime feared Nazi Germany and feared their own ability to 
withstand the German invasion. Those are all logical fears. What becomes illogical is how the 
Stalin regime reacted to that fear internally. Externally the Red Army continued to fight the 
German army and proceeded along military norms. Internally they put forth the conception that 
the Soviet Union was a Russian centric communist state and acted aggressively toward non-
Russians. The Soviets had not successfully integrated ethnic identity into Soviet identity during 
the 1920s, and did it no more successfully in the 1940s. By artificially uniting Russian identity to 
Soviet identity starkly highlighted the fact that the Stalin regime created its own outsiders, 
others, and enemies by marginalizing minority ethnic groups. 
Much has been analyzed  in  Soviet  Studies  around  the  Soviet  construction  of  an  ‘other’  
and the belief in the political necessity of an enemy. Yet in this period, there was an enemy: Nazi 
Germany. A real military, political, cultural enemy, more perfectly constructed than anything the 
Soviets had themselves conceived of in the 1920s or during the Great Terror in the 1930s. Why 
act against small minority groups when Nazi Germany was a perfect foil? The cases are certainly 
different. Of course the outcome of the war was then unknown as the Stalin regime pursued the 
deportations. Also, importantly, the deportations were not publicized, especially not in the way 
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Germany was vilified in the Soviet press. The deportations concerned small groups, and as many 
other scholars before me have shown, who were unfairly judged on the crimes of a small number 
of individuals. This is an example of extreme internalized violence; it was done in secret, to 
small groups, at a non-advantageous time. It was an act of a zealous regime, which compulsively 
purged itself to its own detriment. 
The various ethnic groups deported by Stalin's regime between 1943 and 1945 have 
unique histories, traditions, religions, and relationships with the former Russian Empire. They 
each had their own path after the October Revolution and during the Civil War and each 
eventually reconciled with Soviet power in their own way. Despite drawn out campaigns against 
Tsarist armies, working with Mensheviks or Whites, or colluding with the German army, these 
relationships do not define or include all members of these minority groups. For over a century 
these ethnic minorities were subject to centralized power in Saint Petersburg or Moscow. The 
actions taken against them in the mid-1940s by the Soviet government sprung from no other 
source  than  the  whims  of  Stalin’s  regime.  These  groups  did  not  cause  their  deportations.  There  is  
no cause and effect mechanism in Soviet law or common logic that would predetermine such 
actions. All agency rests with the Stalin regime. 
 Below is a brief description of the deported groups in order of the date of their 
deportation. I have excluded long explanations about their conflict with Tsarist Russia or the 
early  Soviet  State  as  I  believe  them  to  be  immaterial  to  the  regime’s  decision  making  and  
therefore dangerous to an argument. The Soviet government accused these groups of being 
disloyal to the Soviet State, and many authors cite historical conflicts separate from World War 
II  in  their  work  on  the  ‘punished  people’.  (Though  of  course  the  former  actions of minority 
groups does give them a certain stigma in the minds of many people of the former Russian 
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Empire.) Yet there were many, minorities and Russians, who were hostile to the Russian Empire 
and the Soviet State. Further, of those there were many who were also occupied by and partially 
colluded with the German army. Acknowledging the specific histories of the seven deported 
groups discussed in this paper shifts the focus from the fact that the Soviet government chose 
these groups with apparent prejudice. 
 In  addition  to  the  brief  descriptions,  I  have  also  included  each  group’s  interaction,  if  there  
was  one,  with  the  German  army.  Finally,  and  most  importantly,  I  trace  the  story  of  each  group’s  
deportation. How the security forces collected these groups and the circumstance of the places in 
which they groups were left have been documented by many scholars in the last 50 years. Here I 
mainly  use  Otto  Pohl’s  short  but  concise  and  data  driven  book,  Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 
1937-1949.  Besides  Pohl’s  own work in the archives, it is the best English language integration 
of the early works on this subject by Alexander Nekrich and Robert Conquest as well as the 
more recent Russian language work by Svetlana Alieva and especially Nikolai Bugai. 
The first deported group is the Karachays, who are a Turkic people from the North 
Caucasus. They are ethnically related to the Balkars and nominally converted to Islam under 
pressure from the neighboring Kabardians. The Karachay people became part of the Russian 
Empire in 1828 during the invasion of the Caucasus. 
 In  1920’s  the  Karachays  were  granted  territorial  autonomy  by  the  Soviet  government.  
First in 1921 as the Karachay National Oblast as part of the Mountain Autonomous Socialist 
Soviet Republic (ASSR), then as part of the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast (AO) in 
1922, and finally as the Karachay AO in 1926.2 According to the Soviet census 75,736 
Karachays lived in the Soviet Union, with between 90-95% living in the Karachay AO. 
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 Trying to move towards Caspian Sea oil fields and Baku, the German army drove into the 
Caucasus. From August 1942 to January 1943 the Germans occupied the Karachay AO. In those 
six months, the Soviet government found 300 Nazi collaborators out of 37,249 adult Karachays.3 
Regardless, on October  12,  1943  the  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  decreed  the  “liquidation”  
of the Karachays from their territory. On the morning of November 6, 1943 NKVD and NKGB 
operatives gave Karachay families one hour to pack 100 kilograms of possession before they 
were taken by truck and then by train to Kazakhstan and Kirgizia.4  
In total, 69,267 Karachays were deported from the area, and five months later all 
Karachay soldiers were demobilized from the Red Army. The Soviet government also placed a 
10,000  ruble  bounty  on  the  few  ‘outlaw’  Karachays  who  escaped  deportation,  showing  the  
regime’s  intent  to  collect  and  control  the  entire  group.  The  territory  of  the  Karachay  AO was 
split between Krasnodar Kray and Georgia. While in exile from November 1943 to November 
1948 the Karachays lost 12,398 people, about 18% of the total deported population. The 
population was in severe decline until 1949.5 
The Kalmyks are a nomadic Mongol Buddhist people. In the early 17th-century they 
migrated from Western Mongolia to the area between the southwest of the Volga River and the 
Western shore of the Caspian Sea. They are ethnically and religiously tied to Tibetans and 
Buriats, who also worship the Dalai Lama. In 1887 the Kalmyk population of the Russian 
Empire was 190,6006. On November 4, 1920 the Soviet government established the Kalmyk AO 
and on October 20, 1935 the territory was raised to the status of ASSR. Kalmyks clashed with 
the Soviets during collectivization, which disrupted their nomadic lifestyle, and during Soviet 
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religious suppression of Buddhist lamas and monks. Kalmyk culture was allowed to expand 
under korenizatsiia, especially in education. Between 1917 and 1940, the number of schools 
increased 10 times while the number of students increased from 674 to 44,000.  
 The Kalmyk ASSR was briefly occupied by the German army during WWII. The 
Germans reached the capital city, Elista, on August 12, 1942. By December 1942 the Red Army 
retook the republic. Less than a year later the Stalin regime began the process of Kalmyk 
deportation. On October 28, 1943 the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) issued a resolution 
“instructing  the  executive  committee  of  Krasnoyarsk  Kray,  Omsk  Oblast,  and Novosibirsk 
Oblast  to  prepare  for  an  influx  of  Kalmyk  exiles.”7 The next day the Politburo of the Central 
Committee and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ordered the deportation of all Kalmyks from 
the Kalmyk ASSR. 
 On December 26, 1943 Deputy Chief of the NKVD, Ivan Serov, arrived in Elista and 
between December 28 and December 29 2,985 NKVD and NKGB officers loaded 93,139 
Kalmyks on to 46 train echelons. In this two-day period almost the entire nation of Kalmyks, not 
accounting for those still in the Red Army  or  in  neighboring  regions,  was  “uprooted  and  
relocated  thousands  of  miles  away.”8 
 The Kalmyk ASSR territory was added mostly to the Astrakhan Oblast to the east while 
the rest was given to the Stalingrad or Rostov Oblasts to the west and north. From 1944 to 1948 
the NKVD continued to deport Kalmyks from neighboring territories and demobilized Kalmyk 
soldiers.  “The  Stalin  regime  even  deported  the  eight  Kalmyks  living  in  Moscow”9; Pohl 
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succinctly  concludes  that  “the  Soviet  security  forces  successfully  exiled almost every Kalmyk 
living  in  Soviet  territory  to  Siberia.”10 
 The Moscow incident shows the true nature of the deportations. They were insidious, 
highly specific, and completely reliant on ethnicity as a demarcator. While the problems with 
nationalism were tied to socialism and politics as seen in the previous chapters, these actions are 
a step beyond. Targeting ethnic groups is not the objective political act the Soviet government 
claimed. Their actions were fueled by something else. 
 The Kalmyk population was about evenly divided into five special settlement areas in 
Omsk Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Altai Krai, Krasnoyarsk Kray, and Kazakhstan. The Kalmyks 
arrived about February 10, 1944 to their settlement kolkhozes. Enroute 1,200 Kalmyks died, and 
between 1944 and 1948 the NKVD reported that 18% of the populations had perished. 
According  to  Pohl’s  calculations  “22.58%  of  the  total  Kalmyk  population  died  as  a  direct  result 
of the  conditions  in  the  special  settlements,”11 mostly from disease, malnutrition, exposure, and 
exhaustion.  
 The Chechen and Ingush are two closely linked ethnic groups of the North Caucasus 
region. They practice a form of Sunni Islam and generally live in the Mountains south of the 
Terek River. Chechens and Ingush fought a long war against the colonizing forces of the Russian 
Empire, beginning in the late 18th century and ending, according to the Russians, in 1864. Under 
the Soviets, the Chechen AO was created in November 30, 1922 and the Ingush AO a few years 
later on July 7, 1924. On January 15, 1934 the two were combined to create the Chechen-Ingush 
AO, which soon after was changed to Chechen-Ingush ASSR on December 5, 1936. 
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 The German army reached the Chechen-Ingush ASSR on August 8, 1942 and captured 
the large cities of Mozdok and Malgobek soon after. They never reached the capital Grozny. The 
Red Army liberated the territory from the Germans in January 1943, though in the six month 
long occupation the Germans failed to occupy much of the republic. Pohl posits that this was due 
to  “difficult  terrain  and  Soviet  resistance,”12 despite claims that many Chechens and Ingush 
solely worked with the Germans. Almost exactly a year after the Red Army expelled the 
Germans from the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, in January 1944, Stalin authorized the NKVD to 
deport the Chechens and the Ingush from their territory. 
 Chechens were the largest minority group deported by the Soviet government during 
WWII. Eventually the NKVD displaced 387,229 Chechens and 91,250 Ingush. Beria prepared 
for a month and a half  after  Stalin’s  decree,  in  order  to  arrange  the  transfer  of  so  many  unwilling  
people. Beria and his NKVD deputies Serov, Bogdon Kobulov, and Stepan Mamulov arrived in 
Grozny February 20, 1944 to supervise deportations, which they believed would take eight days. 
19,000 members of the NKVD, NKGB, and Smersh and 100,000 soldiers of the NKVD internal 
troops assisted. From February 23 to February 29 almost half a million Chechens and Ingush 
were forced at gunpoint into American land-lease Studebaker trucks and then onto trains bound 
for Kirgizia and Kazakhstan.13 Earlier in the month, the NKVD had confiscated thousands of 
weapons, so the six-day operation was executed with relative ease. 
 The Chechen-Ingush ASSR territory was split between Dagestan ASSR, North Ossetian 
ASSR, and Georgia with the remaining area added to the Stavropol Kray under the name 
‘Grozny  Okrug’.  The  Soviet  government  then  relocated  thousands  of  Russians  to  the  former  
Chechen-Ingush ASSR in an attempt to stabilize the economy after the loss of the majority of the 
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labor  force.  Pohl  claims  that  the  Stalin  regime  did  this  to  “prevent  exiles  from  ever  returning  to  
the  Caucasus”  successfully.14 From February 1944 to November 1948 the group lost 114,259 
people, about 24% of their population, while in exile.15 
 The Balkars are also a northern Caucasian ethnic group, and are closely linked to the 
Karachays. They too are Sunni Muslims who speak a minor Turkic language.16 The Balkars 
became part of the Russian Empire around 1825 during the Caucasian invasion, with the 
Balkars’  main  occupation  being  animal  husbandry.  After  the  Civil  War,  the  Soviets  territorially  
joined the Balkars with the Kabards and not the Karachays. The Kabard-Balkar AO was created 
in September 1921. The territory gained ASSR status on December 5, 1936. The Balkars were a 
minority  within  their  own  ASSR,  as  they  only  made  up  about  11%  of  the  republic’s  population  in  
1939.17 
 The German army occupied the Kabard-Balkar ASSR for five months, from August 1942 
to January 1943. Despite the German’s  brutal  treatment  of  civilians  in  Kabard-Balkar territory, 
Beria urged Stalin to include the Balkars in the deportations of northern Caucasian minorities. 
The NKVD began preparations to deport the Balkars two days after Beria made his suggestion to 
Stalin. On Feb 26, 1949 Beria issued a NKVD decree on the resettlement operation of the 
Balkars. On March 8 and March 9, 1944 the NKVD deported 37,713 Balkars to Kazakhstan and 
Kirgizia. This was carried out by 17,000 NKVD troops and 4,000 NKVD-NKGB operation 
workers.18 
 While this operation was certainly approved by Stalin, the deportation of the Balkars was 
urged by Beria and the NKVD. As opposed to the other minorities, the Presidium of the Supreme 
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Soviet gave their approval for the deportation of the Balkars after the fact, a month later after on 
April 8, 1944. As the Balkars were living in horrible conditions in special settlements, the Soviet 
government wiped their names from the maps. The Kabard-Balkar ASSR became the Kabard 
ASSR, and a small portion of the southwest mountains were given to Georgia. From March 1944 
to November 1948 6,015 Balkars, or 16% of the population perished, One third of those died 
during transport.19 
 Crimean Tatars are a Turkic ethnic groups which practices Sunni Islam. They speak a 
Turkic language similar to that spoken by the Karachays and the Balkars. The Crimean peninsula 
became directly controlled by the Russian Empire in 1783 after 75 years of conflict as the 
Russians tried to gain access to the Black Sea. 
 After the Soviets established the USSR, the SNK created the Crimean ASSR in October 
1921. Though Crimean Tatars only represented about a quarter of the population of the republic, 
they  were  given  “considerable  cultural  autonomy”20 In 1938 the Crimean Tatar population was 
only 19.36%, whereas the Russian population was 49.6%. In addition, collectivization and the 
end of korenizatsiia in the late 1930s deeply affected the Crimean Tatar economic and cultural 
lifestyle. 
 The Crimean peninsula was invaded by German and Romanian troops in September 
1941. From this time until April 1944 the entire Crimean peninsula was occupied by the German 
army. Many Russians viewed Crimean Tatars negatively prior to WWII, and out of all the 
deported groups, the Crimean Tatars had the largest number of collaborators. However their 
territory  was  occupied  by  the  Germans  for  years  as  opposed  to  months.  Pohl  states  that,  “As  
many Crimean Tatars actively fought against the Nazis as participated in German sponsored 
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military  units.”21 Yet, the NKVD and Beria began preparations for their deportations almost 
immediately after the Soviets retook Crimea. Days after Beria sent Stalin a telegram detailing the 
exaggerated number of Crimean Tatar army deserters and weapons stockpiles, Stalin signed a 
GKO resolution to deport Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatars were accused of assisting the 
Nazis  in  “mass  destruction  of  the  Soviet  people.”22 The NKVD, directed by Serov and Kobulov, 
used 23,000 officers of the NKVD and 9,000 operatives of the NKVD-NKGB to load 183,155 
Crimean Tatars on to trains bound for Uzbekistan. Between May 18 and May 20, 1944 almost all 
Crimean Tatars were exiled from Crimea. After they arrived to the same barely habitable special 
settlements  of  the  other  ‘punished  people,’  the  MVD  reported  that  between May 1944 and 
January 1946, 14% of the Crimean Tatar population had perished.23 
Living on the Crimean peninsula was also a sizeable population of Greeks and 
Bulgarians, who at that point were called Soviet Greeks and Soviet Bulgarians. A Greek 
population had lived in the area, and the area sounding the Black Sea in Southern Russia and 
Georgia, since the 7th century BC. During the reign of Catherine the Great, Greeks were invited 
to colonize the Crimea and a century later many Pontic Greeks settled in the area24 after fleeing 
the Ottomans in Asia Minor. In 1938 there were 20,653 Soviet Greeks living in Crimea.25 
 After the Red Army expelled the Germans from Crimea and a month after the deportation 
of the Crimean Tatars, Stalin ordered Beria to expel the Soviet Greeks from Crimea. This 
operation took place from June 27 to July 3 1944 and the population was sent to Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Kenarov, Molotov, Sverdlovsk, and Bashkir ASSR.26 The Stalin regime also 
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deported many Soviet Greeks from Black Sea area in Southern Russia and Georgia. In Ukraine, 
in the area around the Crimean peninsula, there were three Greek national raions,27 from which 
the Stalin regime also expelled Soviet Greeks. In 1942 a small number of Soviet Greeks were 
deported from the Black Sea area. But in the summer 1944, a large scale deportation occurred 
with Soviet Greeks, Crimean Armenians, and Soviet Bulgarians. Under advisement from Beria, 
“Stalin  personally  issued  the  order  to  deport  the  Crimean  Greeks,  Armenians,  and  Bulgarians.”28 
The NKVD deported 15,040 Crimean Greeks, 8,200 Soviet Greeks from Rostov and Krasnodar, 
and 16,376 Soviet Greeks from Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Greek Red Army soldiers 
were  moved  to  work  battalions  until  the  end  of  the  war  when  they  were  exiled  with  their  ‘ethnic 
compatriots’. 
 Unlike the earlier deportations, the Soviet government did not collect the Soviet Greek 
population in one raid. Perhaps because the Soviet Greek diaspora was spread widely across the 
Soviet Union. Greek deportations continued until 1949 when the NKVD sent 57,680 Greeks and 
Armenians from the Black Sea coast and the Southern Caucasus to Kazakhstan on June 14 and 
June 15, 1949. From 1942 to 1950 the Soviet government issued six decrees about the 
deportations of Soviet Greeks, showing the dedication of the Stalin regime to a full ethnic exile. 
 In exile the Soviet Greek population of Greek speakers declined by 25%. Their death rate 
is hard to quantify because many documents refer to all deported ethnics groups from the Black 
Sea  area  as  ‘Crimeans’.  Though  the  experience  and  mortality  rate  of  the  Soviet  Greeks  who  lived  
in the poorly assembled special settlements is likely very similar to that of the other groups. 
 Lastly, and seemingly most confusing when compared to the narrative told by the Soviet 
government in which deportations denote collusion with the Nazis during WWII, are the 
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Meskhetian Turks, Soviet Kurds, and Khemshils. Meskhetian Turks are descendants of Georgian 
Muslim converts who adopted the Turkish language during Ottoman rule in the Caucasus in the 
17th and 18th centuries.29 Pohl  describes  them  as  “culturally  almost  indistinguishable  from  the  
majority  population  of  Turkey.”30 Soviet Kurds were simply Kurds who lived in Georgia, and 
who had been in Transcaucasia since the 10th century. The Khemshils are ethnic Armenians who 
converted to Islam and live on the border of Turkey and Georgia. All of the populations became 
Soviet citizens and part of the Georgian SSR in 1924.  
Prior to Soviet military and diplomatic pressures on the Turkish government after WWII, 
in July 1944 Beria recommended to Stalin that the Meskhetian Turks, Soviet Kurds, and 
Khemshils  should  be  deported.  Stalin  agreed  and  signed  a  GKO  resolution  “On  the  resettling  
from the Border Belt of the Georgian SSR...The Turks,  Kurds,  and  Khemshil.”31 Rapidly and 
using 20,000 NKVD internal troops and 4,000 NKVD-NKGB operations workers, Beria 
assigned NKVD deputy commissioner Kobulov to deport 94,955 people from Georgia between 
November 15 and November 28, 1944.  
The Meskhetian Turks, Soviet Kurds, and Khemshils were settled in Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Kirgizia. Due to inhospitable conditions, 19,047 or 20% of the deported 
population died within 5 years. And because of frequent escape attempts the three populations 
were kept under notably strict control of the NKVD and MVD.  
Simultaneous as these groups lost their rights as Soviet citizens, their ancestral 
homelands, and their lives, many famous and much examined events were occurring in Europe 
and in the Pacific. To hopefully clarify all the data and mortality statistics presented, here is a 
brief timeline of the deportations within the context of the Red Army and Ally operations. The 
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German army invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941; in September 1941 the Crimean peninsula 
was invaded, just as the siege of Leningrad began and the USS Green was fired on by a German 
U-boat. The Germans reached Karachay, Kalmyk, Chechen-Ingush, and Balkar territories 
throughout August 1942. At this time, August 23, the German army begins its advance into 
Stalingrad and Georgy Zhukov is appointed to defend the city. About a month before this pivotal 
battle was won, in January 1943 the Red Army retook Karachay, Kalmyk, Chechen-Ingush, and 
Balkar territories. In the same week the residents of the Warsaw Ghetto first rose up against the 
Germans.  
In November 1943, while Karachays were being deported, the Red Army liberated Kiev, 
the Italians bombed the Vatican, and the US landed on the Solomon Islands. As the NKVD 
deported the Kalmyks, Eisenhower was named head of Normandy operations and the Red Army 
was  fighting  Manstein’s  army  to  the  bank  of  the  Dnieper  line.  As  the  half  a  million  Chechen-
Ingush were being deported, the Red Army initiated their Narva offensive, the Allies bombed 
Leipzig, and the US took the Admiralty Islands. In early March 1944 as the Balkars were forced 
to Kazakhstan, the Red Army forced the German army into major retreat in the western front of 
the Dnieper and Tallinn and Narva were bombed by the Soviet Air Force. Two days after Crimea 
was liberated and almost 200,000 Crimean Tatars were deported, the Allies bombed Paris and 
Romanian oil fields. As Soviet Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians were exiled from Crimea in 
June 1944, the Red Army expelled the Nazis from Belarus and began to take back the Karelian 
Isthmus. Finally in late November 1944 as Strasburg was liberated, Hitler fled to Berlin from 
Rustenburg, and Himmler ordered the destruction of Auschwitz II-Birkenau gas chambers and 
crematoriums, about 95,000 Soviet Turks, Kurds, and Khemshils were deported by the Soviet 
government. 
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Deportations are not simply a violent act in the moment, but a thought out, long term act 
of destruction of a group. These groups were deported from their homes quickly and 
aggressively. At gunpoint they were taken from their homes with very little or no warning. They 
could take with them very few or no possessions. Apart from the material possessions, land that 
had been cultivated for generations, with certain specific techniques, was abandoned. Large and 
complex family networks were broken up, as the NKVD usually separated these ethnic 
minorities into four or five smaller groups, which were then sent to various special settlements. 
Immediate family was kept somewhat together, but extended family clans were broken up. In 
addition, when the Red Army demobilized soldiers from these deported groups, there was no 
guarantee that families would be reunited. 
Apart from the psychological and emotional toll of the deportations, these groups were 
physically punished. Though the Soviet government did not shoot these minorities or kill them 
directly, there is no reason to view their deaths in special settlements as any less violent. The 
Soviet government designed and built these special settlements and certainly knew the limitation 
of the surrounding area, as well as the limited supplies the residents would be given. The Soviet 
government had years of experience building and maintaining the camps in the GULAG system 
and therefore had an actual idea of how the deported would live. With knowledge of their 
GULAG system, and its reluctant ability to keep people alive, the Soviet government knew that 
the deported groups would die en masse from neglect. During the month, and sometimes two 
month, long journey in train cars, tens of thousands of people perished. The best data for the 
amount of deceased deportees is reported for the period between the initial deportation, which 
took place from fall 1943 to winter 1944, and 1949-1950. This data taken by the NKVD shows 
that for all deported groups there was negative population growth and between a 15-20% 
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mortality rate for the initial deported population (this included deaths en route to camps and in 
settlement deaths).32 
During  the  decade  between  the  deportations  and  Stalin’s  death  there  were  no  indications  
from the Soviet government that these groups would ever be released and cleared of their 
charges. In this period the punished people carried on as best as they could. Even Stalin's death 
in 1953 would not have signaled change.  Now  Stalin’s  tight  control  of  the  government  and  
especially his involvement with the deportation is known. In 1953 the high echelons of power in 
the Soviet Union were closed and any future plan Khrushchev may have had for the punished 
people perhaps seemed impossible. Yet in 1956, Khrushchev included a critique of the 
deportations in his greater condemnation of Stain and his cult of personality. He refuted all 
previously public statements about the validity  of  the  deportations  and  stated  that,  “no  man  of  
common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical 
activity.”33 Unfortunately Khrushchev did not publicly absolve all of the deported groups of their 
guilt. Khrushchev only apologized to the Karachay, Kalmyk, Chechen-Ingush, and Balkar 
populations in his speech. Khrushchev's semi-public statement on the innocence, or lack thereof, 
of certain groups was directly responsible for the last period of violence caused by the 
deportation:  the  groups’  return  to  their  homelands. 
After the Soviet government deported these ethnic minorities in the early 1940s, they 
repopulated their homes with other Soviet citizens, most often Russians. Many of the territories 
from which the groups were deported had significant Russian populations already, but more still 
were used to settle the empty houses and farms. New residents to these renamed areas took 
possession of everything that was left behind by the deported peoples. Life moved on in the 
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places the punished people once lived. Due to this, and to the fact that the Soviet government 
gave no support to the groups that wished to move back, when the deported minorities were 
finally released and allowed to return to their homes there was nothing left for them. The conflict 
and discrimination experienced by the returning minority groups is the final and ongoing legacy 
of the deportations.  
For those who chose to stay in places like Kazakhstan, after leaving the isolated special 
settlements, there were clashes with local populations. For those who choose to return to the 
RSFSR  there  were  also  clashes  with  the  ‘new’  local  populations.  Reintegration  into  normal,  legal  
Soviet society was not smooth or welcome. Interestingly, the clashes between formally deported 
groups and colonizer Russian were hot spots, especially in the Caucasus and in Crimea. They 
pointed out the fraudulent structure and inconsistent government of the Soviet Union and lead to 
its breakup. The aftermath of the deportations showed clearly and publicly the prejudice fostered 
by the Soviet government since the late 1930s. The hate that drove Stalin and Beria to execute 
these violent acts was the same feeling that extended the isolation and misery of the deported 
groups well after they  were  ‘released’.  A  lack  of  rehabilitation  and  strong  Russian  nationalism  in  
the Russian Federation shows that while the fervor and instability of the Stalin regime during 
WWII is long past, the framework that allowed for such actions is still in place. Simply waiting 
for another catalyst. 
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Conclusion 
 From 1943 to 1944 the world was in chaos in many places, from Europe to the South 
Pacific. In the midst of this chaos it was not difficult for the Soviet government to deport almost 
a million people from the Caucasus and the Black Sea region in relative secrecy. The violence of 
modern warfare and the violence of racial hatred outside the Soviet Union overshadowed the 
deportations and unfortunately long concealed Soviet internal warfare. It was very difficult to 
find information about why these deportations occurred, as at first they seemed so sudden and 
out of place in the timeline of the Soviet Union during WWII. The culture of the Soviet Union 
during the war, the culture that seemingly must have fostered the deportations, is largely 
uninvestigated. We know of how Soviet civilians and soldiers suffered, but there is little about 
how the war influenced society as it was happening. I did not find that society during the war 
was truly suspended. More accurately, Soviet society in the early 1940s was still dominated by, 
and grappling with, the major upheavals in national, economic, and political policy from the late 
1930s.  
 Our ability to investigate the deportations is greater than ever before. Each year brings 
new scholarship and new documents that shed light on how the Soviet Union operated. In 1953 
an article was written titled, The Fall of Beria and Nationalities Question in the USSR. In the 
article  the  author  states  the,  “cult  of  the  Russian  people”1 was  inaugurated  with  Stalin’s  famous  
1945 speech: A Toast to the Russian People. The author goes on to claim that the war brought "a 
new  and  vigorous  uprising  of  Russian  nationalism.”2 He  writes  that  there  was  “lull  [for]  several  
years due to  the  war”3 in  the  struggle  against  national  deviation  and  that,  “between  1939  and  
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2 F.F., 483. 
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1946  ‘ideological  vigilance’  had  relaxed.”4 This type of early reporting on the activities within 
the Soviet Union is mostly worthless. Due to a lack of accurate information, most of those 
previous  ‘facts’  are  incorrect.  In  a  footnote,  the  author  wonders  if  maybe  “the  large-scale 
deportations  of...the  Chechens  and  Ingushi”5 can be considered a lull, but even that point cannot 
be judged honestly because the author is unaware of the extent of the deportations. Nonetheless, 
soon dissident academics brought their knowledge of the deportations and Soviet national policy 
to the West. And ultimately archives opened in Moscow, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
Siberia, which revealed huge amounts of information synthesized in this paper. 
Even so, much scholarship on the deportations has either focused on the lives of the 
minority groups too far in the past (i.e. on minority clashes with the Tsars, with the Bolsheviks 
during the Civil War, or with the Soviets during collectivization) or too close to the deportations 
(i.e. the number Crimean partisans, tanks bought for the Red Army by the Karachays, or Kalmyk 
cavalry riders). The background and war actions of the deported groups are important only when 
inserted into the framework in which the Soviet government operated. Knowledge of the 
reversals and re-reversals of national policy and understanding that monopoly on power and 
centralization were the primary aims of the Stalin regime is essential to further work on ethnic 
violence. The deportations do not follow objective logic, but it is possible to understand them in 
terms of the specific mindset and goals of the Stalin regime. 
While the Bolsheviks found the national problem difficult to cleanly solve, they were 
aware of issues facing multiethnic socialist states from the very beginning of the 20th century. 
Reconciliation between colonizer and colonized of the former Russian Empire would have been 
a difficult task without the added introduction of Marxist ideology. Though Lenin believed his 
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policy of self-determination to be well developed, it failed to gain supporters during the Civil 
War when the liberation movements spread from Central Asia to Ukraine to the Caucasus. To 
create trust where Lenin, and at the time Stalin, realized there was none, the new Soviet state 
implemented korenizatsiia to govern the territories they had recently conquered. Within the 
RSFSR many, but certainly not the majority, territorial units where claimed as autonomous 
oblasts or republics for a local ethnic group. The autonomous regions may not have been 
politically or economically autonomous but other freedoms were assured. The early Soviet 
government assured minority rights with various articles in the 1924 constitution, with the policy 
of korenizatsiia, and with territorial autonomy (though national territories often had a majority 
Russian population). The concession to nominally shared power sprang from the distrust, which 
Lenin refers to as“skittishness,”  that  the minorities felt towards the Bolsheviks. In general, it is 
easy to see the many ways in which the Soviets differed from the Russian Tsars. But the Soviets 
would eventually validate the fears of the minority groups by reinstating the traditional ethnic 
hierarchy. 
The Tsarist regime practiced large scale population transfer as well, and in some ways the 
Soviet deportations are a continuation of this historical trend. Though both authorities were 
ethnically motivated, the actions of the Soviet government have a malicious and hateful quality, 
which is not mirrored in the apathetic moving of the insignificant done by the Russian Tsars. The 
communications between Stalin and Beria as they plan the deportations use formal and bland 
prose,6 and show little feeling. Yet the emotions Stalin enflamed with his nationalist rhetoric and 
the extralegal actions taken by Beria during the physical deportations speak. The words and 
actions of these two men show, more than any lost private admission of specific enmity, how 
much they hated these groups. A desire to collect every member of an ethnic group from all 
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corners of a vast country in order to send them to substandard internment camps is not the act of 
an indifferent regime. The huge amount of effort and meticulous planning show how deeply the 
Stalin regime wanted the deportations to be carried out. Their methods can only indicate that the 
regime saw these deportations as necessary. While the justification for such misandry is almost 
immaterial, how the Stalin regime came to persecute these unsuspecting groups can be partially 
explained. 
The reasons why the Stalin regime believed the deportations to be so essential can be 
traced back to the fundamental instability of Soviet national policy and the recent changes in 
Soviet society before WWII, both of which were exacerbated due to the war. Before the 
Revolution, Stalin paraphrases Marx and concludes, “that  the  life  of  society  is  the  foundation  on  
which  social  consciousness  is  built.”7 From his beginnings, Stalin internalizes the ideal that the 
way in which the people of a socialist country interact and live is intrinsic to how social 
consciousness is built. After revolution and class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat 
brings democracy by way of all people being the same, each a member of the proletarian class. 
Fixation on class identity leaves no room for ethnic identity, and therefore privileges based on 
ethnicity would be non-existent. In the early 20th century, Austrian and Jewish socialists posit 
that ethnic identity and Marxist ideas could unite, since ethnic hierarchies are always constructed 
by the upper-class in capitalist societies. Lenin moves towards the Austrian collaboration in his 
own work, and makes the distinction between the ethnic communities that lived under 
imperialism and those that were the imperial powers. He views ethnic identity as an important 
designator of community and social life to some because it was suppressed (this perspective may 
itself be condescending, but Lenin reaches an egalitarian conclusion). After allowing certain 
ethnic communities to freely express themselves class consciousness would eventually manifest 
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and the people would be able to focus on their more destructive class differences. This is an 
idealistic and almost untested inversion of ethnic ranks. There are very few multiethnic societies 
free of racial hierarchies for Lenin to use as a model for this plan. Nonetheless, drastic changes 
needed to be implemented to peacefully move forward. 
Lenin’s  distinction  between  minority  nationalism  and  majority  nationalism  was  his  
greatest contribution to Soviet ethnic relations and national policy. His earlier ideas about self-
determination were insulting to both left-wing Bolsheviks and minority groups, and the concept 
disappeared quickly during the Civil War. By endorsing local, or minority, nationalism Lenin 
tries  to  move  towards  a  functional  egalitarian  society,  because,  to  reiterate  Stalin’s  words  from  
the  previous  paragraph:  that  is  how  “social  consciousness  is  built.” 
Yet by the mid-1930s, Lenin and most of the old Bolsheviks were dead. Stalin, who fully 
believed  in  the  importance  “of  maximum  development  of  national  culture”8 when he made a 
1929 speech to Ukrainian writers, seemed to be unable  to  wait  for  “national  culture...to  exhaust  
itself  completely.”9 Stalin  claimed  that  “we  want  to  unify  the  nations  of  various  countries  by  
dividing  them,”10 but  by  1935  the  Stalin  regime  wasn’t  dividing  nations  into  dozens  of  unique  
groups. There were only two groups: Russians and non-Russians.  
Russian nationalism certainly existed in the Soviet Union but it was greatly encouraged 
by  Stalin.  Vlasov’s  army  is  one  of  the  most  flagrant  examples  of  Russian  nationalism,  but  far  
earlier intelligent people began  reading  the  signs  coming  from  Stalin’s  regime,  which  indicated  
that the regime itself was encouraging this new policy. In an attempt to use Russian nationalism 
is a political tool to generate greater centralized authority Stalin drove fully into the perceived 
advantages of articulated ethnic hierarchies. To validate his political goals, Stalin conceived of a 
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new  theoretical  way  of  asserting  the  ‘correctness’  of  the  Russian  redemption.  Metaphors  such  as  
Friendship of the Peoples and Family of Nations, which took the place of decades long national 
positions, were weak and could not sustain the identity of the Soviet Union. Wartime fears and 
uncertainty merged with the fear that the new conception of unity was too vague or too 
disputable. Reacting to this dual vortex of fear, the Soviet government did what it did best: 
deflected  its  anxiety  to  an  ‘other’  and  purged  an  imaginary  internal  enemy. 
There are many documents and eyewitness accounts which clearly show that not only 
were the deportations not solely driven by minority wartime actions, but Stalin and Beria 
discussed  deporting  certain  ‘punished  people’  even  before  the  Germans  invaded.  In  1940,  Beria  
recommended  to  Stalin  that  the  North  Caucasus  area  needed  “special  measures”11 to combat 
deviation. Incidents such as this show how the timeline for the deportations, conventionally 
1943-1944, actually expands out to before the war. The lies told by the Soviet government, who 
for example claimed that Crimean Tatars aided the Nazi retreat from the peninsula, even though 
they had already been deported to Central Asia12,  emphasize  the  regime’s  perhaps  subconscious  
recognition that their actions were a breach of core Soviet ideology. 
In his 1970 book Nation Killers, Robert Conquest writes that as a historian of the Stalin 
era,  “the  story  of  [Stalin’s]  treatment  of  these  small  minority  peoples  may  seem  no  more  than  an  
episode,”13 when  compared  to  the  Great  Terror;;  “Yet  it  is  an  episode  so  startling,  and  so  
symptomatic, that it deserves the attention of all who wish a complete grasp of the systems and 
attitudes  then  established  in  the  USSR.”14 I  have  found  Conquest’s  quote  to  be  extremely  
accurate. When I choose to investigate the deportations, I had no inkling that the act would be so 
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intertwined with the core problems in the Soviet Union. The inability to mediate the relationship 
between national and ideological identity not only caused tragic deportations, but also the 
eventual breakup of the Soviet Union. 
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Acronyms 
 
AO---Autonomous Oblast, an autonomous administrative unit below AO created for a certain 
ethnic group within the republics of the Soviet Union. 
 
ASSR---Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, autonomous administrative unit above AO and 
below SSR created for a certain ethnic group. 
 
GKO---State Defense Committee, highest organ of power during WWII; created June 30, 1941 
by SNK, Tsk, and the Supreme Soviet of USSR with Stalin as chairman. 
 
MVD---Ministry of Internal Affairs, new name as of 1946 for the NKVD. 
 
NKGB---People’s  Commissariat  for  State  Security,  secret  police  and  counter-espionage service 
during various periods from 1941 to 1946. 
 
NKVD---People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, all-union law enforcement agency that 
oversaw operations from police officers to the GULAG system. 
 
Smersh---Death to Spies, counter-intelligence organ broken into three independent departments 
each under the authority of the NKVD, the Red Navy, or the NKO (Peoples Commissariat for 
Defense). 
 
SNK---Council  of  People’s  Commissars (sometimes Sovnarkom), the highest governmental 
authority and responsible for administration of the state. 
 
SSR---Soviet Socialist Republic, ethnically based administrative units whose union made up the 
USSR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
67 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
Primary Sources 
Khrushchev, Nikita. Speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
USSR.  Moscow. 25 Feb. 1956. Web. 
<http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2007/apr/26/greatspeeches1>. 
Stalin, Joseph. For Peaceful Coexistence; Postwar Interviews. New York: International 
Publishers, 1951. Print. 
- - -. Briefly about the Disagreements in the Party. Caucasian Union Committee of the 
R.S.D.L.P., May 1905. Web. http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/ADP05.html 
- - -. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. New York: International, 1945. Print. 
- - -. Marxism and the National and Colonial Question. Honolulu: UP of the Pacific, 2003. Print. 
- - -. Marxism and the National Question. New York: International Publishers, 1942. Print. 
- - -. National Factors in Party and State Affairs. Theses for the Twelfth Congress of the Russian 
Communist Party, 24 March 1923. Web. http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/NF23.html 
- - -. The National Question Once Again. Concerning the Article by Semich, June 1925. Web. 
http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/NQOA25.html 
- - -. The War of National Liberation. New York: International Publishers, 1943. Print. 
Stalin, Joseph, and H. Bruce Franklin. The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings 1950-52. 
Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1972. Print. 
Secondary Sources 
Books 
Allworth, Edward. Soviet Nationality Problems. New York: Columbia UP, 1971. Print. 
68 
 
 
 
Azrael, Jeremy R., ed. Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices. New York: Praeger, 1978. 
Print. 
Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew. The Role of Migration in the History of the Eurasian Steppe: Sedentary 
Civilization  Vs.  “Barbarian”  and  Nomad.  New  York:  St.  Martin’s,  2000.  Print. 
Bugai, Nikolai Fedorovich. L. Beriia--I.  Stalinu:  “Soglasno  Vashemu  Ukazaniiu--.” Moskva: 
AIRO XX, 1995. Print. 
Clark, Katerina, E. A. Dobrenko, Andrei Artizov, and Oleg V. Naumov. Soviet Culture and 
Power: A History in Documents, 1917-1953. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 
Clark, Katerina, E. A. Dobrenko, Andrei Artizov, and Oleg V. Naumov. Soviet Culture and 
Power: A History in Documents, 1917-1953. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 
Conquest, Robert. The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities. London: 
Macmillan, 1970. Print. 
- - -. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York: Viking, 1991. Print. 
Critchlow, James. “Punished  Peoples”  of  the  Soviet  Union:  The  Continuing  Legacy of  Stalin’s  
Deportations. New York: Helsinki Watch, 1991. Print. 
Dunham, Vera Sandomirsky. In  Stalin’s  Time:  Middleclass  Values  in  Soviet  Fiction. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1976. Print. 
Getty, J. Arch, and Oleg V. Naumov. The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-destruction of the 
Bolsheviks, 1932-1939. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1999. 
Hajda, Lubomyr, and Mark R. Beissinger. The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and 
Society. Boulder: Westview, 1990. Print. 
Hirsch, Francine. Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge & the Making of the Soviet 
Union. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2005. Print. 
69 
 
 
 
Jansen, Marc, and N. V. Petrov. Stalin's Loyal Executioner: People's Commissar Nikolai Ezhov, 
1895-1940. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2002. 
Jones, Ellen, and Fred W. Grupp. Modernization, Value Change, and Fertility in the Soviet 
Union. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge UP, 1987. Print 
Knight, Amy W. Beria:  Stalin’s  First  Lieutenant. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993. Print. 
Kolarz, Walter. Russia and Her Colonies. London: George Philip and Son, 1952. Print. 
Mandel, William M. Soviet but Not Russian.  Edmonton: Univ. of Alberta Press, 1985. Print. 
Martin, Terry. The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 
1923-1939. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001. Print. 
Nahaylo, Bohdan, and Victor Swoboda. Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem 
in the USSR. New York: Free, 1990. Print. 
Naimark, Norman M. Stalin’s  Genocides. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010. Print. 
Nekrich, A. M. The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End 
of the Second World War. New York: Norton, 1978. Print. 
Olcott, Martha Brill, Lubomyr Hajda, and Anthony Olcott. The Soviet Multinational State: 
Readings and Documents. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1990. Print. 
Pohl, J. Otto. Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949. Westport: Greenwood, 1999. Print. 
Polian, P. M. Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR. 
Budapest: Central European UP, 2004. Print. 
Rothstein, Andrew. Soviet Foreign Policy during the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials. 
Vol. 1. London: Hutchinson & co., 1946. Print. 
Sheehy, Ann. The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some 
National Minorities. London: Minority Rights Group, 1973. Print. 
70 
 
 
 
Simon, Gerhard. Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From 
Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society. Boulder: Westview, 1991. Print. 
Smith, Jeremy. The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-23.  New  York:  St.  Martin’s,  
1999. Print. 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993. Print. 
- - -. The Structure of Soviet History: Essays and Documents. New York: Oxford UP, 2003. 
Print. 
Tishkov, V. A. Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind 
Aflame. London: Sage, 1997. Print. 
Tolz, Vera, and Melanie Newton. The USSR in 1991: A Record of Events. Boulder: Westview, 
1993. Print. 
Wolfe, Bertram David. Khrushchev  and  Stalin’s  Ghost:  Text,  Background,  and  Meaning  of  
Khrushchev’s  Secret  Report  to  the  Twentieth  Congress  on  the  Night  of  February  24-25, 
1956. Westport: Greenwood, 1983. Print. 
 
Articles 
Blitstein,  Peter  A.  “Cultural  Diversity  and  the  Interwar  Conjuncture:  Soviet  Nationality  Policy  in  
Its  Comparative  Context.”  Slavic Review 65.2 (2006): 273-93. JSTOR. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4148593>. 
Cadiot, Juliette.  “Searching  for  Nationality:  Statistics  and  National  Categories  at  the  End  of  the  
Russian Empire (1897-1917).”  Russian Review 64.3 (2005): 440-45. JSTOR. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3664603>. 
71 
 
 
 
F., F. "The Fall of Beria and the Nationalities Question in USSR." Royal Institute of 
International 
Affairs 9.11 (November 1953): 481-97. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40392574. 
Hirsch,  Francine.  “Toward  an  Empire  of  Nations:  Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet 
National  Identities.”  Russian Review 59.2 (1991): 201-26. JSTOR. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2679753>. 
Jersild,  Austin.  “Faith,  Custom,  and  Ritual  in  the  Borderlands:  Orthodoxy,  Islam,  and  the  ‘Small  
Peoples’  of  the  Middle  Volga  and  the  North  Caucasus.”  Russian Review 59.4 (2000): 
512-26. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2679276>. 
Roeder,  Philip  G.  “Soviet  Federalism  and  Ethnic  Mobilization.”  World Politics 43.2 (1991): 196-
232. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010471>. 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. “Nationalist  and  Ethnic  Unrest  in  the  Soviet  Union.”  World Policy Journal 
6.3 (1989): 503-28. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209117>. 
Weitz,  Eric  D.  “Racial  Politics  without  the  Concept  of  Race:  Reevaluating  Soviet  Ethnic  and  
National  Purges.”  Slavic Review 61.1 (2002): 1-29. JSTOR. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696978>. 
 
